DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 178 457 SO 012 132

TITLE	The Developmental Theorists' Approach to Moral/Citizenship Education.
INSTITUTION	Research for Better Schools, Inc., Philadelphia, Pa.
SPONS AGENCY	National Inst. of Education (DHEW), Washington, D.C.
PUB DATE	78
GRANT	OB-NIE-78-0207
NOTE	134p.; For related documents, see SO 012 131-134; Paper presented at Moral/Citizenship Education Conference (Philadelphia, PA, June 4-6, 1976)
AVAILABLE FROM	Research for Better Schools, Inc., 444 North Third Street, Philadelphia, PA 19123 ($8.00)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC06 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	*Citizenship; Curriculum Development; Developmental Programs; *Developmental Psychology; *Developmental Stages; *Educational Objectives; Educational Philosophy; Educational Practice; *Educational Theories; Elementary Secondary Education; Ethical Instruction; *Moral Development; Moral Values

ABSTRACT

The document presents a paper outlining moral education as a focus for developmental education. Three critiques of the paper are also presented. Developmental theorists believe that the individual's moral judgment progresses through a series of irreversible stages. The educational objective is to assist or stimulate stage-by-stage progression of the individual's moral growth. The paper also presents an analysis of current public school developmental programs. The conclusion is that under conditions of significant role taking and a balance between experiential learning and intellectual inquiry, pupils achieve positive levels of moral, values, and psychological development. The document presents recommendations to stimulate in-class applications of developmental programs. The first critique offers recommendations for developmental moral education based on seven areas of concern. The second critique argues that developmental educators have not worked through some central tenets crucial to an effective program in citizenship education. The final critique raises the question of whether developmental theory can be subject to the same criticism that the authors propose about other theories. (Author/KC)

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ED178457

THE DEVELOPMENTAL THEORISTS' APPROACH TO MORAL/CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION

MORAL/CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION CONFERENCE
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
June 4-6, 1976

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Winter 1978

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SP 012 132

Published by **RESEARCH FOR BETTER SCHOOLS, INC.**
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The work upon which this publication is based was performed pursuant to Grant OB-NIE-78-0207 with the National Institute of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

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PREFACE

This pamphlet, one of a series of four, contains a major paper on moral education and three critiques of that paper. The paper was presented at a national Conference on Moral/Citizenship Education held in June of 1976, and the critiques were commissioned independent of the conference. Three other major presentations at that conference, and accompanying critiques, comprise the companion pamphlets to this one. Each pamphlet sets forth and illuminates one of four theoretical approaches to moral education: cognitive-decision theory, developmental theory, prosocial theory/research, and values theory. These approaches were selected because it was felt that they represent areas of research, development, and writing which have had the most significant impact on the field.

Although the series is conceived as a unit providing an overview of selected moral education perspectives, each pamphlet is intended to stand alone as representative and expository of one specific approach.

Conference Background

The conference at which the papers were presented was a highlight of a 1975-76 yearlong planning effort carried out by Research for Better Schools (RBS) under contract with the National Institute of Education (NIE). The conference brought together approximately 85 experts representing a

variety of viewpoints and interests.

The primary purpose of the conference (in addition to facilitating an exchange of information across the field) was to develop moral/citizenship education recommendations from as wide a base as possible concerning research, development, and dissemination. The key process was one of interaction, with work groups arriving at recommendations on the basis of the four major informational papers collected in this publication series, and work-group deliberations. The recommendations were then submitted to NIE and the public.

On the basis of the conference recommendations, a coordinated plan of R, D, & D for moral/citizenship education (at that time termed ethical-citizenship education) was developed which has the endorsement of a wide and influential constituency. Work is in progress to advocate and implement that plan.

In the past year Moral/Citizenship Education and Ethical-Citizenship Education have merged as a broadly conceived Citizen Education component of RBS. The front and back matter of this pamphlet summarizes aspects of that component, including objectives, affiliations, and resources.

The Developmental Approach to Moral Education

The major paper and the critiques in this pamphlet deal with the developmental approach to moral education, a brief

summary of which follows. This highly condensed statement can portray only the most general characteristics of the developmental perspective. It is included here simply to orient the reader, not to define the field.

Developmental theorists have had a significant influence in the schools over the years. The concepts of psychological, social, and cognitive development are well accepted, and the concept of the development of moral judgment follows upon the popular and pervasive theories of stage development in social and cognitive growth. Developmental theorists hold that there are age-related stages of moral judgment that correlate with, and may well be dependent upon, cognitive and social role-taking development. The theory posits that the individual's structure of moral judgment progresses up through a series of irreversible stages. Generally these stages are a progression from self-centered to species-centered considerations. Thus individuals grow from stage to stage in their ability to make moral judgments, beginning with animalistic self-interest and progressing to a world/mankind perspective. The developmentalists claim cross-cultural validity; that is, these stages of moral judgment are universal experiences of man. The theorists are further distinguished by their focus upon moral judgment, not action. The educational objective of the developmentalists is to assist or stimulate stage-by-stage progression of the

individual's moral judgment until the highest level of growth is reached. Developmentalists in moral education are currently gaining wide recognition in the public press and the educational profession. However, they are just beginning to have an impact on schools in limited pilot situations. In the main, those working from the developmental approach are educational psychologists and some educators who are attempting to engineer the ideas of the developmentalists in school situations.

A DEVELOPMENTAL CURRICULUM FOR SECONDARY SCHOOLS: NEED, PURPOSE, AND PROGRAMS

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University of Minnesota

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The authors present an outline defining the general goals of schooling as including moral/citizenship education as a central focus for developmental education. The current psychological impact of schooling is examined. A strong case is presented suggesting that schools need to include values development as a primary objective of education. Specific educational objectives are detailed as derived from a cognitive-developmental framework, including Dewey, Piaget, Kohlberg, Loevinger, Erikson, and Elkind. Multiple, yet related, perspectives are presented as a means of defining the key developmental constructs of stage, structure, and interaction. An analysis of recent developmental programs and courses currently being tried out in public schools is presented, along with an examination of the psychological effects. Many programs from different sections of the country have yielded significant results. Under conditions of significant role taking and a balance between experiential learning and intellectual inquiry, pupils achieve positive levels of moral, values, and psychological development. These promising directions for schooling are summed up in a series of recommendations designed to stimulate the creation of more actual in-class applications of moral, values, and psychological developmental programs.

In this paper we offer a rationale for needed educational programs as well as a discussion of theory and practice. We make the case at the outset that schooling as presently organized tends to ignore or avoid personal growth as a major

objective. Development of the pupil's character, values orientation, and ability to think and act upon ethical and citizenship questions is notably absent from most school programs. Ironically, this void is most apparent during adolescence, at a time when youth are particularly affected by ethical questions. In our view, then, the educational need for values and psychological development is most pressing (and that development most notably absent) during the secondary school years.

The framework we present is broad. We wish to avoid a narrow moralistic view or advocacy of an equally singular set of values to be imposed as a solution to the current educational gap. Instead, we present a case for educating the whole child through a process we call developmental education. The goal of developmental-education programs is to stimulate pupil growth in a deliberate fashion. The areas include education for responsibility, character development, and ethical as well as empathic growth. Effective schools for the future simply must have impact on both the intellectual and the affective components of human growth. As a nation we cannot afford to continue an educational policy of drift (or, more realistically, a nonpolicy) vis-à-vis questions of ethical and personal values and the psychological development of morally sensitive, psychologically strong, and intellectually alert human beings.

To achieve these objectives in the real world of schools is, of course, no easy task. There has been a series of recent promising educational programs oriented to the goal of personal, ethical, and values development. We use the general concept of developmental education as a theoretical framework to include a variety of approaches currently in use. Although there is disparity by technique, there is a common set of outcomes. The values/ethical curriculum of Beck and Sullivan differs in some respects from the moral-dilemmas discussion format of Kohlberg in both content and technique, yet the outcomes are similar: They stimulate more complex, comprehensive reasoning by pupils on questions of social justice. Further, the so-called "just" high school approach varies in specifics from some of our own sequenced classes in deliberate psychological education, yet there is a major similarity: Pupils in both programs are taught to participate in significant adult social and psychological roles. The involvement is active and is focused on real questions of living and learning. As a result, the pupils in both programs gain on measures of psychological and ethical maturity.

One final point: The programs we describe in the general category of developmental education are neither armchair abstractions nor brief episodic fads. Each has been developed over the past 5 to 8 years in real schools or natural environments. Each has been subjected to rigorous (and

continuing) evaluation. Together they represent a significant new direction for democratic education. We are still in the early stages; there is much to be done. We present these ideas and programs for careful consideration as a promising beginning--education for the whole person. John F. Kennedy, in his last year of life, noted in his State of the Union Address (1963) that "the future of any country which is dependent upon the will and the wisdom of its citizens is damaged, and irreparably so, whenever any of its citizens are not educated to the full extent of their talents."

Rationale: Roles to Play, Tasks to Perform and Skills to Develop in Adolescence

Recently an eminent theorist on the nature of adolescence, Gisela Konopka, challenged our adult society to develop effective educational programs for the teenagers of the country. She noted that the degree to which adolescents experience responsible participation in society determines and maximizes their human development. This does not suggest that adolescence is simply a transitory stage which humans pass through; if such were the case, we could all survive it through forbearance. Instead, Dr. Konopka states, this stage presents a special opportunity to all adults concerned about maximizing effective human growth: "We believe adolescents are persons with specific qualities and characteristics who

have a participatory and responsible role to play, tasks to perform, skills to develop" (Konopka, 1973, p. 292).

Adolescents should not be viewed as preadults, preparents, or preworkers, but as growing persons. The kind and quality of their development do not unfold automatically, romantically, or idealistically. Their development is seen as a function of their interaction with society at large. Erik Erikson (1959) has commented that society rebaptizes its youth during adolescence. This confirmation can be as active, psychologically healthy, mature, significant humans with a strong sense of personal identity, or the obverse--as passive, dependent, inferior, other-directed humans with a confused and diffused identity. If we exploit, demean, order, and direct the growing adolescent, we can inflict permanent scars and prematurely inhibit healthy development. Such damage may not be as visible as a physical handicap, but the handicap remains, only inside.

Adolescents in the American culture are thus by any standards confronted with major problems of personal development during the time they attend secondary schools. Almost any index confirms the existence of these multiple difficulties among teenagers and young adults. High school dropout rates, low academic achievement, drug usage, runaways, and personal alienation stand as examples of current and obvious problems. Of course, it must be noted that many of these problems are

not new. Adolescence, by definition, has always been a somewhat turbulent era, especially in societies that deliberately make the adolescent a marginal person, denied adult status and responsibility. In addition to the difficulties created by coming of age, there is also the array of adjustment problems caused by the pronounced rate of physiological change during this period, with its inevitable psychological effect.

Several years ago we published an article in The American Psychologist (Mosher & Sprinthall, 1970) to which the response was quite extraordinary; thousands of letters of inquiry were received. Primarily we argued that personal development should be a central focus of education; following this was a sketchy outline of what education for personal development might be like. In retrospect our rationale was more persuasive and passionate than the curriculum we outlined. We wrote as counseling psychologists, humanists, and teachers frustrated by the gap between what we offered adolescents and what we knew our students' lives and concerns to be. We wrote at the end of the 1960s, a time of marked turmoil, which the universities and young people felt with particular intensity. We said then, and still believe, that "youth (both white and black) experience and are more deeply affected by such problems because they live, psychologically, in a more exposed and vulnerable position" (Mosher & Sprinthall, 1970, p. 912).

Adolescence, in the best of times, is not something parents would choose for their children; and in the 1960s adolescence, exacerbated by racism, drugs, the generation gap, divisiveness over Viet Nam, seemed the worst of times to come of age. Perhaps we "catastrophized." Self-appointed tribunes of the young have been known to do this. But we also remembered how John Kennedy and Martin Luther King had represented to youth what seemed best about America. For anyone who continues to care about humanizing education, there is cold comfort in the evidence that "going along" has now replaced student militancy in suburbia; that a generation of poor adolescents, both black and white, will get at best an inferior education because of the short-term disaster that is urban school desegregation; and that alcohol rather than barbiturates is the current teenage drug of choice.

In a second point we made, we indicated that we believed public schools were in trouble--deeply so in the city, subtly so in the suburbs. Confronted by a peculiarly confused and anguished group of young persons, the schools lacked appropriate programs:

> Schools, either city, suburban or rural, have tended to define their role as the transmitters of academic ideas and skills. Recent efforts at reform have been directed at revitalizing the existing academic curriculum and its teaching. Very little intellectual energy or funding has been directed toward reformulating education--that is, the development of essentially new curricula and new forms of educating adolescents. In most schools and in most eras, the

> personal side of education has had a lower priority than the academic. The school has always had extensive rhetoric about individual growth, but de facto personal or psychological development has been largely the result of random (and often inimical) forces in the school. (Mosher & Sprinthall, 1970, p. 913)

In short, we argued that psychology and education have no choice but to help adolescents and young adults as persons who are trying to mature in an unusually difficult situation. Although the form of the difficulties has changed since those years, the substance has not. Read alcohol for acid, privatism for protest; the generic problems of development remain. Cosmetic changes only mask--they do not fundamentally alter.

James Coleman (1961) first gave us a detailed account of the result of society's failure to provide for effective psychological education for young adults. In his classic study, The Adolescent Society, he clearly pointed out the negative effects of the oppressive peer group in promoting the Madison Avenue values of good looks, fast cars, and being in with the leading crowd. He found the impact so broad as to appear almost endemic. Similarly, Erikson, in a remarkably prophetic statement just prior to Coleman's study, noted:

> Youth after youth, bewildered by some assumed role, a role forced on him by the inexorable standardization of American adolescence, runs away in one form or another; leaving schools and jobs, staying out all night, or withdrawing into bizarre and inaccessible moods. (Erikson, 1959, pp. 90-91)

Thus, in any general sense, our society has not developed

an effective response to the challenge posed by adolescence as a stage of development and as an opportunity to maximize psychological growth. We will now turn to the specific question of the current impact of schooling and the need for new forms of education involving elements of action, learning, and experience for growth.

Schools Adolescents Attend: Schooling Is Not Neutral

If we turn for a moment to examine the current impact of schooling upon teenagers, we shall find further evidence for the urgency of needed educational solutions: new forms, new programs, and new experiences designed to enhance rather than impede development. Friere (1972) has correctly pointed out that there is no such thing as a neutral educational process. By definition, education is not a values-free concept. Shaull, in his foreword to Friere's work, notes:

> Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to it, or it becomes the "practice of freedom," the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world. (Shaull, 1972, p. 15)

A recent series of extensive studies has researched the psychological impact of schooling upon adolescent pupils. Such studies provide a searching illustration of the extent to which schooling in general becomes the "practice of freedom" or something quite different. A rash of recent books

and articles depict graphically what is really learned in school (Coleman, 1961; Friedenberg, 1959; Jackson, 1968; Kohl, 1967; Kozol, 1967). Research on teaching (Hoetker & Ahlbrand, 1969) indicates that teaching is still predominantly "telling" and that pupils typically are intellectually passive and dependent on teachers.

All of these studies raise profound questions about the basic objectives of schooling. Multiple failures of the institution of schooling are implied. The "common" school as the goal of public education is simply a convenient myth, as Schrag (1965) and others point out. Schools tend to perpetuate rather than reduce social and educational differences among children (Brophy & Good, 1974). Seeley, Sim, and Loosley (1956) indicate the extent to which the values of secondary-age pupils are a reflection of family backgrounds, a result cross-validated through the massive Coleman (1966) study on the equality of educational opportunity. The explosive situation in slum schools heightens our awareness of the problems created by schooling that systematically avoids the person, personal development, or human growth as major and directed educational objectives. It is now obvious that poor black and white children have indelibly learned to regard themselves with self-contempt as a result of schooling (Coleman, 1961; Kohl, 1967; Kozol, 1967; Leacock, 1969). What else they may have learned (reading, spelling, writing) may

be academic and esoteric in the most literal sense. It is also obvious, if we listen to the voices from the ghetto, that what the adults want for their children is the opportunity to develop a strong and stable self-concept, a sense of personal identity.

The School's Role in Psychological Education

Until recently, schools have generally assumed that their mission was to focus on the intellectual and/or skill development of their pupils. Personal and psychological growth was ruled off limits for regular classroom experiences. Of course, it was hoped that personal development would be positively influenced, at least as a by-product, through studies in the standard curriculum. Ironically, recent research on the impact of schooling (including Coleman, 1961; Jackson, 1968; Minuchin, Biber, Shapiro, & Zimiles, 1969; Ojemann, 1958; Silberman, 1970; Sprinthall & Mosher, 1971) indicates that just the reverse actually happens. The so-called hidden agenda or implicit curriculum of most schools teaches for negative outcomes. Intrinsic interest in learning declines and negative self-concepts increase, the longer a pupil remains in school. Stereotyped surface and judgmental thinking increases. Self-confidence in problem solving decreases. Personal autonomy in learning tasks decreases. Personal alienation, inhibition, and isolation increase. Interpersonal competition in a negative sense increases (Johnson &

Johnson, 1974). A specific example: In the various subject-matter disciplines it is taught that teachers have power and that children are impotent and irresponsible; they should be dependent intellectually and personally. The emphasis on achievement, competitiveness (or cheating), and a belief that self-worth is tied to academic achievement are further examples. This is a harsh critique of the school, but evidence suggests that this hidden curriculum is typically more inimical and psychologically crippling than it is positive and developmental.

Who Is to Blame? The Culprit Theory

This critique of schooling is not based on any specific culprit theory leading to the deliberate educational destruction of children as an intentional outcome. Such conspiracy theories do abound; e.g., teachers themselves are only near-adults and therefore unconsciously punish any attempt by teenagers to develop independence; or educational administrators are only concerned about manipulation and the exercise of power. Obviously these are simple-minded stereotypes and clearly hinder the creation of more effective educational programs. Paradoxically, we are all victims of inadequate educational theory and practice. Teachers, counselors, administrators, university professors, children, and their parents are all caught in the same nexus. For too long we have accepted a series of educational myths and unexamined

assumptions about teaching and learning. Moreover, we have not faced the implications as negative information emerged. Recently, for example, a massive systematic study by Flanagan (1973) on the impact of traditional methods of curricula has revealed less than positive outcomes. Fewer than two-thirds of a huge sample (n = 250,000) of secondary pupils in English could understand one-half of Robert Louis Stevenson's Treasure Island. Less than one-third understood Rudyard Kipling, and only 8% Jane Austen. In social studies the picture was no more optimistic. Scriven (1972) reported that less than one-quarter of the teenagers in this country can present a two-page outline with arguments for and against democracy as a form of governance, and that approximately two-thirds of the general public in this country resolutely oppose every practical instance of free speech. And yet the standard curriculum remains intact.

No matter how imaginatively taught, the standard curriculum contains an intrinsic educational contradiction. The materials and teaching style tend to assume rather than promote development. They assume that pupils are capable of transferring and/or incorporating vicarious concepts to positively enhance their own psychological and intellectual development. The balance of real experience and reflection, process and content, emotions and thought, affective and cognitive learning is significantly missing in most curricula. In other

words, the vehicles in the form of instructional theory and materials are inadequate to the task. John Dewey remarked that education is and always will be in the hands of "ordinary" men and women. Most of us educators are "ordinary" men and women; and obviously we cannot succeed with inadequate tools. It is our view, based on our experience, that ordinary men and women can reach extraordinary goals with appropriate educational techniques guided by theory. Our task, then, is the creation of new educational forms, practice, and theory to enhance classroom learning. We know we cannot continue to view teaching and learning as the transmission of knowledge from the shelves of the Library of Congress directly into pupils' minds.

William James perhaps best summarized the inadequacy of the rote-memorization approach--thinking without experience--with the following example:

> A friend of mine, visiting a school, was asked to examine a young class in geography. Glancing at the book she said, "Suppose you should dig a hole in the ground, hundreds of feet deep, how should you find it at the bottom--warmer or colder than on top?" None of the class replying, the teacher said: "I'm sure they know, but I think you don't ask the question quite right. Let me try." So, taking the book, she said: "In what condition is the interior of the globe?" and received the immediate answer from half the class at once: "The interior of the globe is in a condition of igneous fusion." (James, 1958, p. 106)

It should be pointed out that learning through experience alone is clearly not a credible alternative. Experience for

its own sake will not necessarily stimulate growth to more complex stages. Supposedly when a teacher candidate presented himself to John Dewey with the claim, "I've been teaching for ten years," Dewey's question was, "Ten years? Or one year ten times?"

Romantic educational critics have wrongly assumed that Dewey's dictum of learning by doing did not include the parallel components of disciplined inquiry and hard thinking. There are qualitative differences in what and how much learning can be drawn from a variety of experiences. The old philosophical chestnut asserting that "push-pin is not the same as poetry" is to the point.

A Time for a Paradigm Shift

Kuhn (1965) has suggested that scientific and educational change does not occur as a result of sudden, dramatic breakthroughs. Instead, he points out, the process of real change follows a predictable but slow evolutionary sequence. As studies, findings, and discussions accrue over a number of years and increasingly cast doubt on our basic assumptions, a gradual change is set in motion. Kuhn denotes this process as a slow paradigm shift. The generally accepted assumptions which make up the current paradigm or theoretical model become increasingly difficult to defend logically. There is a weakening of the ground upon which the common frame of reference stands. Most of us, being creatures of stability

and habit, have difficulty recognizing these gradual shifts. As William James noted so many years ago, we become perceptual old fogies at tender ages and use our intellectual mechanisms to make the new look like the old. At the same time, the accrual of logic eventually causes us to accept the new assumptions or, in Kuhn's phrase, the new paradigm and frame of reference. Thus, in a specific sense, numerous assumptions of so-called traditional teaching methods and definitions of curriculum materials have been undergoing examination over the past 10 to 15 years. This suggests the importance for all of us to catch up with the change process and to understand the paradigm shift rather than to engage in recriminations or expend energy in seeking single-variable culprits to carry the responsibility for educational disasters.

Our original question was from Friere (1972): Do schools seek to induce conformity, or can they stimulate the practice of freedom? The evidence strongly suggests that the general impact is negative. This does not mean that all schools fail or that all teaching is narrow, pedantic, and passive. It does mean that the common assumptions of vicarious learning, knowledge transmission, and pupil receptivity are no longer adequate. It also means that if we accept the implications of the paradigm shift, we need to look further than new ways to teach about the Tigris and Euphrates, Beowulf, and the scientific equivalents of igneous fusion.

It is both interesting and disheartening to note that recent studies have demonstrated that actual classroom interaction in most schools is still predominantly a teacher-talk/pupil-listen mode. Studies from as far back as 1912 found that over 80% of all classroom talk consisted of teacher talk in the form of brief, direct, factual questions at the rate of about four per minute. In studies conducted in the 1960s, fully 50 years later, the results were astonishingly similar: Teacher talk accounted for 70% of all classroom talk, again mostly in the form of brief, direct, factual questions at the rate of two to three per minute. The most recent Goodlad and Klein study of a national random cross section of classrooms indicated the same general pattern:

> At all grade levels, the teacher-to-child pattern of interaction overwhelmingly prevailed. This was one of the most monotonously recurring pieces of data. The teacher asked questions and the children responded, usually in a few words and phrases.... It is fair to say that this teacher-to-child interaction was the mode in all but about 5 percent of the classes. (Goodlad & Klein, 1974, p. 51)

It is time for a paradigm shift. Both form and content at the secondary school level require fundamental reexamination. Coleman recently suggested that the school must shift its function from such limited and classical objectives. We need to reduce the school's dependence on such goals, so that it can take on new ones:

> The new goal must be to integrate the young into functional community roles...since the school's

> function will no longer be to protect the child from society but rather to move him into it. The school must be integrated with service organizations, such as those providing medical services, so that the young can help in them. (Coleman, 1972, p. 106)

In Coleman's view the critical general education goals are to make responsible, productive human beings "who can lead in a task or follow, and who are able to live with the consequences of their own actions" (Coleman, 1972, p. 106).

It should be clear throughout this entire rationale that adolescents need and deserve responsible roles to play and that schools need and deserve new programs to meet such reciprocal requirements. Dr. Harvey Scribner (Note 1), the former head of the largest school system in the country, accurately perceived the problem as arising from the false dichotomy of intellectual versus personal learning. As a result, he has called for a redefinition to eliminate the distinctions between acquisition of skills and psychological development. An effective school, he suggests, is one "which defines its curriculum as opportunities to grow simultaneously both in skills and psychologically."

Ralph Tyler (Note 2), an eminent educational psychologist, has called for similar changes in curriculum experiences for adolescents: "Schools have failed to provide opportunities for young people to mature through assuming responsible social roles. The schools tend to serve children,

to plan for them when the need is for the teenagers to serve and plan for others."

If the school is to enhance the "practice of freedom" on the part of growing citizens in its charge, it is clear that new developmental-learning programs are now requisite. Of course, the assumptions of a new educational balance in learning between action and reflection are of critical importance. We will now turn to a careful examination of these educational assumptions and objectives which form the framework and paradigm for new educational programs.

Theoretical Considerations: Educational Objectives

Throughout the earlier portions of this report we have indicated the need to create a series of learning experiences designed to promote psychological maturity. In this section we will outline some of the theoretical considerations related to the nature of such development.

We obviously cannot simply refer to the process of change in such broad and general terms as personal growth, psychological maturation, and/or affective education; these expressions are too imprecise as educational objectives. So too with the general term development. The objective of this section is to provide a framework and a variety of perspectives on the nature of psychological development during adolescence. Admittedly such a framework will be loose, given

the nature of the state of theory at the moment. Hopefully, the framework can be viewed as a series of important proximate constructs to clarify the nature of adolescent development and its relationship to deliberate psychological education programs.

There are some in the educational enterprise who maintain that such theorizing is unnecessary, scholastic, and even distracting. We do not hold such a radical empirical view. Directing constructs are important, not as examples of creative or esoteric meanderings of the mind but rather as logical, powerful explanation systems. We hold that such theorizing in its best sense represents a relatively parsimonious method of organizing a series of empirical facts into coherent order. The objective of such ordering is to feed back to practice. Thus we line up with William James (once again) and Dewey in seeking pragmatic outcomes from theoretical explanations. Our interest is not served by moving from theory to metatheory and ad infinitum toward increasingly higher levels of multiple abstraction. James (1958) has commented tellingly on the attractiveness and futility of artificial abstractions and postmortem study. Our intent is to seek a balance between theoretical explanations and usefulness for practice.

Without theory, we fear that practice would wander in episodic and discontinuous directions, forever subject to the

latest fad, intuition, or unexamined impulse, like the newest educational hula-hoop. Practice without theoretical structure becomes ephemeral, lost somewhere between the cosmic and trivial, a laundry list of do's and don'ts. At the same time we hope to avoid the other extreme of theorizing for its own sake, an orgy of intellectual tours de force, simply a means of displaying cognitive abstractions or, as it is sometimes referred to, erogenous mind stimulation. With these reservations, we will now examine the question of educational objectives for theory and practice of deliberate psychological education.

The problem posed by adolescence as a stage of development, and its relationship to personal education, is simple yet critical. All too frequently curricula are developed without regard for the pupils, their age, or their stage of development. Although some lip service is paid, through field trials of materials to see what does and does not take, the problem is usually begged. The perspectives provided by a variety of developmental theorists begin to consclidate the relationship between a specific educational program and a particular state of growth. Prior to a detailed analysis of the specific development perspectives, however, it is necessary to reexamine the basic developmental assumptions derived from the classic work of John Dewey.

A Developmental Perspective: John Dewey[1]

Archambault (1964), in his preface to John Dewey on Education, said: "It is a commonplace that everyone talks about Dewey and no one reads him." Dewey's argument that the aim of education is the development of the individual is still the clearest philosophical rationale for the education we are creating. In a succinct essay published originally in 1934, entitled The Need for a Philosophy of Education, Dewey makes a series of telling points:

> What then is education when we find actual satisfactory specimens of it in existence? In the first place it is a process of development of growth and it is the process and not merely the result that is important....An educated person is the person who has the power to go on and get more education. (Dewey, 1964, p. 4)

Dewey then makes the point that Rousseau's notion of natural development (i.e., human beings, analogous to seeds, have latent capacities which if left to themselves will ultimately flower and bear fruit) has at least two fallacies: that people are vastly more complex in their development and potential than are plants; and that development is a matter of the kind of interaction that occurs between the organism and its

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[1]A portion of this discussion on Dewey's theory was presented by the second author at the Phi Delta Kappa Research Symposium, University of North Carolina at Greensboro, January 1976.

environment. Nature and nurture, in interacting, produce development. Dewey argued that development (or education) starts with the pupil:

> Every mind, even of the youngest, is naturally or inherently seeking for those modes of active operation that are within the limits of its capacity.... The problem, a difficult and delicate one, is to discover what tendencies are especially seeking expression at a particular time and just what materials and methods will serve to evoke and direct a truly educative development. (Dewey, 1964, p. 5)

What Dewey did not and could not know was what, indeed, characterizes development, whether it be intellectual, moral, or social, at a particular stage or time in a person's life. A generation of research in genetic epistemology and developmental psychology--by such people as Piaget, Kohlberg, Loevinger, and others--now offers educators relatively clear blueprints of what people are like at various stages in their lives and what it is that stimulates their intellectual, moral, and personal-social growth. This information, available to us and not to Dewey, says much in developmental <u>fact</u> about Dewey's remarkably prophetic phrase concerning the tendencies especially seeking expression at a particular time. What developmental psychology does not concern itself with, but developmental <u>education</u> does, is "just what materials and methods will serve to evoke and direct a truly educative development." But of that, which is the genuinely original thing we are learning or contributing, more later in this paper.

There is little need here to examine Dewey's critique of traditional education--the external and authoritative imposition of subject matter and skills, which he compared quaintly to inscribing records on a phonographic disk that will play back when the proper button has been pressed. That traditional system (and its more contemporary critique) is still too much with us, as we have noted. Criticism, in the final analysis, is cheap; constructive reformulation of educational practice is much harder work. But our critique of the schools adolescents attend, in the original American Psychologist article (Mosher & Sprinthall, 1970), is absolutely fundamental to understanding our continuing odyssey in developmental education.

Dewey's more salient point regarding progressive education was not to stop short with recognizing the importance of giving free scope to native capacities and interests. This was really another statement of "Don't fall into the Rousseau trap or all you'll do is get out of the child's way." One has the impression that much of the criticism of progressivism as country-club existentialism or directionless activity may have derived from critics who genuinely misunderstood how much more than this Dewey was saying--about the intricate developmental characteristics and how they must be seen as potentialities and processes which are not enduring stages; with experience and time these stages evolve profoundly.

The special obligation of the educator to understand deeply the psychology of cognitive, moral, and social development is part of the charge which Dewey was anticipating. The other part has to do with the core task of developmental education: the devising and testing of the curricula (i.e., the systematic educational experiences) which permit a person continually to grow from experience. Dewey anticipated something we are now learning--that we must pay more attention, not less, to the subject matter and pedagogy of developmental education. Devising and validating those experiences that indeed affect development is far more complex than rewriting the curriculum in American history or literature. There are far more knowns, precedents, and criteria for doing the latter. Dewey states:

> The great problem of the adult who has to deal with the young is to see, and to feel deeply as well as merely to see intellectually, the forces that are moving in the young; but it is to see them as possibilities, as signs and promises; to interpret them, in short, in the light of what they may come to be. Nor does the task end there. It is bound up with the further problem of judging and devising the conditions, the materials, both physical, such as tools of work, and moral and social, which will, once more, so <u>interact</u> with existing powers and preferences as to bring about transformation in the desired direction. (Dewey, 1964, p. 8)

It would be nearly a generation before seeing intellectually the forces moving in the young would be translated into comprehensive, empirical, psychological data or knowledge. And it is really only in the past 5 years that "devising the

conditions...which will...so interact with existing powers... to bring about transformation" has begun to be rendered into concrete curriculum with developmental effects. Just how rigorously that had to be done was anticipated by Dewey:

> If we do not go on and go far in the positive direction of providing a body of subject matter much richer, more varied and flexible, and also in truth more definite...than traditional education supplied, we shall tend to leave an educational vacuum in which anything can happen. (Dewey, 1964, p. 9)

A valid supposition is that providing the appropriate body of subject matter is what the progressive educators could not bring off. They could not, in our view, partly because available knowledge of the psychological stages, characteristics, and experiences contributing to human development was grossly inadequate. In any event, the project method is a pretty lightweight translation of what Dewey was calling for. Maybe current or subsequent critics of developmental education will similarly damn our efforts with faint praise. The charge remains, however, as does the consequence of ineptitude.

> The young live in some environment whether we intend it or not and this environment is constantly interacting with what children bring to it, and the result is the shaping of their interests--minds and character--either educatively or miseducatively. If the professed educator abdicates his responsibility for judging and selecting the kind of environment that his best understanding leads him to think will be conducive to growth, then the young are left at the mercy of all the unorganized and

> casual forces of the modern social environment that inevitably play upon them as long as they live. (Dewey, 1964, p. 9)

Dewey makes two additional points in this same essay which have profound meaning for contemporary developmental education. He says development is a continuous process, and that means the experiences or action which stimulate development will have a quality of consecutiveness--of planned order. He warned:

> It is comparatively easy to improvise, to try a little of this today and this week and then something else tomorrow and next week....Without care and thought [this] results all too readily, in a detached multiplicity of isolated short-time activities or projects and the continuity necessary for growth is lost. (Dewey, 1964, p. 11)

An honest appraisal of the curriculum we outlined in the American Psychologist article (Mosher & Sprinthall, 1970) would see it as vulnerable to this charge; our present curricula as discussed in the following section are relatively much less so. But we are still some distance from the curricula or the knowledge by which to order experiences to stimulate consecutive development. We perceive the need and the outline of how to get there, but much growth and testing remain to be done. This is the essential raison d'être of developmental education. At this point, however, let us move to a more specific analysis of current developmental theories as a means of illuminating the relationship of educational programs and objectives as well as the complementary nature

of the several theories. Variations on the same overall theme or, more elegantly, synergistic multiple perspectives on development, become our objective in the next section.

Specific Developmental Perspectives

There are at least four current frameworks describing the nature of psychological development during adolescence which are related to general developmental-education programs: cognitive developmental (Jean Piaget), moral/ethical developmental (Lawrence Kohlberg), ego developmental (Jane Loevinger), and personal developmental (Erik Erikson, David Elkind). These theories help explain the nature of developmental growth and aid in suggesting actual learning experiences for adolescents. Thus we claim that the multiple developmental frameworks are both descriptive and prescriptive. Psychological learning theory is usually held aloof from practice--like ships passing in the night. The common dichotomy is to separate learning theory (which describes how children learn in the abstract) from instruction theory (which prescribes methods and lesson plans). Rather than isolating a theory of learning from a theory of instruction, we believe that if we know what development is, then we can derive what practice should be. The rationale for this has been detailed recently by Kohlberg and Mayer (1972) and need not be repeated here. Suffice it to say that we are aware of

the possible naturalistic fallacy in moving from a theory of what is (description) to what ought to be (prescription).

Developmental Stages: Egg to Caterpillar to Butterfly

The concept of stages of development is central to the theorists who follow. It was, of course, John Dewey who originally formed the idea that children and teenagers move through developmental stages. A child is not, in this view, a midget-sized adult who simply grows quantitatively from small to large. Each stage is qualitatively distinct and represents a special way of organizing the thought process used to understand the world. This qualitative growth can be compared to the transformations of the egg to caterpillar and to butterfly. Although each stage of development is unique and separate, each succeeding stage builds upon the prior stage and is dependent upon it.

As a pupil develops, then, there is a major shift at specific age-related points in terms of general cognitive processes. Whether growth and development occur from stage to stage, however, depends upon the kind and quality of interaction with the environment. This is a crucial, if not the most important, aspect of developmental theory and practice; growth neither takes place automatically nor unfolds unilaterally. A person needs a series of significant experiences--interactions with the environment at particular times--to promote the shift from a lower to a higher stage

of development. Without significant experiences at critical times, psychological growth will cease and will prematurely stabilize at stages below full potential.

From a developmental standpoint adolescence is a stage in which almost all persons can learn to function at relatively high levels of intellectual, moral, ego, and personal development. Whether such learning takes place depends upon the general educational experience which occurs. We shall now detail four aspects of psychological development during adolescence and underline the relationship between such growth and educational programs.

Cognitive Growth

Piaget (1952) has been a most important source of psychological knowledge concerning adolescence and has created a theoretical rationale for intervention that is relevant to adolescent pupils. He has suggested that only during adolescence, and not before, is an individual capable of certain modes of thought. What Piaget calls "formal operations" in thought provide an opportunity for an individual to think in modes qualitatively different from those possible during childhood. Adolescents can conceive of possibilities and probabilities; they can think abstractly about themselves; their sense of time perspective changes; and they can perceive themselves in a variety of ways, both now and in the future. Such a new mode of perceiving and understanding is

tremendously significant if we are concerned about personal questions. When pupils do in fact become capable of these new ways of thinking, an educator has an opportunity for deliberate education.

The specific developmental programs described below are heavily oriented toward understanding the nature and complexity of human behavior; the conceptions demand the potential for formal operational thought. The technique of counseling procedures, which is part of one program, has an obvious relation to the process of thinking about human behavior, both in self and others, in nonabsolutist ways. Abstract thought about a variety of personal and subjective possibilities also is central to effective counseling procedures when the topic is self. Finally, genuine empathy connotes the abstract ability to enter someone else's subjective world, to understand and experience from another's point of view.

One of the major shortcomings of schooling, particularly the standard curriculum, has been the failure to promote the use of formal operations. Estimates indicate that only 50% of secondary school pupils actually develop the ability to use formal operations. While almost all are potentially able to learn abstract thinking, a substantial number do not achieve it (Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971). A major reason for this outcome derives from the fact that much of the regular secondary school curriculum assumes rather than promotes

cognitive development, as we have noted. It assumes, for example, that pupils can place themselves vicariously in the position of characters in major literary works. Without significant experience, however, many students never really understand the point of this.

Analysis of other subject-matter areas indicates parallel difficulties; teaching often takes for granted that students already can think in formal abstract operations. Although pupils may learn to emit the proper response in these areas, careful inquiry usually reveals lack of genuine understanding.

An important educational objective of our programs, then, is to deliberately promote the use of formal operations by combining genuine experience with reflection on the complexity and subjectivity of human behavior.

Figure 1 indicates the general form of the Piagetian stages of cognitive development.

Figure 1

Stages of Cognitive Development: Piaget

1. Sensorimotor: Birth to 2 years. Learning is based primarily on immediate experience through the five senses. Children have perceptions and movements as their only tools for learning. Lacking language, they do not have the ability to represent or symbolize thinking and thus cannot categorize experiences. One of the first sensorimotor faculties to develop is visual pursuit, the ability to perceive and hold a visual object with the eyes. Object permanence, which is developed later, refers to the awareness that an object can still exist even though it cannot be seen. A lack of vision during this period will prevent the growth of mental structures.

2. Preoperational or intuitive mode: 2 to 7 years. During this period children are no longer bound to the immediate sensory environment and build upon abilities such as object permanence from the sensorimotor stage. The ability to store mental images and symbols (words and language as a structure for words) increases dramatically. The mode of learning is a freely experimenting, intuitive approach--one that is generally unconcerned with reality. Communication occurs in collective monologues in which children talk to themselves more than to each other. Use of language during this period, then, is both egocentric and spontaneous. Although language is the major learning focus at this age, many other environmental discoveries are now made, each using the freewheeling, intuitive approach.

3. Concrete operations: 7 to 12 years. It is during this period that the dramatic shift in learning strategy from intuition to concrete thought occurs. Reality-bound thinking takes over, and children must test out problems in order to understand them. While the difference between dreams and facts can be clearly distinguished, the difference between a hypothesis and a fact cannot. Children become overly logical and concrete; once their minds are made up, new facts will have no effect. Order becomes an absolute.

4. Formal operations: 12 years and beyond. At this stage the child enters adolescence, and the potential for developing full formal patterns of thinking emerges. The adolescent is capable of attaining logical-rational or abstract strategies. Symbolic meanings, metaphors, and similies can be understood, and implications and generalizations can be made.

Moral Development

In this area the recent work of Kohlberg (1971, 1973; Note 3) is particularly significant. Basing his study on a long series of field interviews designed to find out how humans really think about problems of social justice, Kohlberg discovered that the process of making judgments actually formed a developmental sequence of six stages (which are summarized in Figure 2).

After investigating people differing in age, social and economic class, and culture, Kohlberg, like Piaget, found a parallel sequence of stage growth. Kohlberg also found that the majority of teenagers stabilize in moral-judgment thinking between what he designates as Stage 3 and Stage 4. This means that most high school pupils employ a system of thought which assumes that justice means either to go along with the crowd (other-directed behavior)--Stage 3; or to rigidly apply a standard of law and order regardless of circumstance--Stage 4.

Without significant new interactions with the environment, most teenagers enter adulthood with rather stereotyped systems of thinking about major questions of legal and moral justice. Thus moral development appears to be prematurely stabilized. Most unfortunately, the system of thinking undergoes few changes after adolescence, as society and current educational practice are organized.

As we have noted in reference to Piaget, cognitive growth to the use of formal and abstract thinking demands a stimulating curriculum--the need to promote, not assume, development--as does the growth of moral and social-justice thinking and judgment. Teenagers need opportunities to be directly confronted with major problems of the human condition. Such real interaction can provide an experience base upon which to build a more adequate system of thinking and acting upon moral questions.

Figure 2

Stages of Moral Growth: Kohlberg

Basis of moral judgment	Stage of development
Preconventional Level I: Moral value resides in external quasi-physical happenings, bad acts, or quasi-physical needs rather than in persons and standards.	Stage 1 Obedience-and-punishment orientation: Egocentric deference to superior power or prestige, or a trouble-avoiding set. Objective responsibility. Stage 2 Naively egoistic orientation: Right action is that which instrumentally satisfies the self's needs and occasionally others' needs. Awareness of relativism of values to each actor's needs and perspectives. Naive egalitarianism and orientation to exchange and reciprocity.
Conventional[a] Level II: Moral value resides in performing good or right roles, in maintaining the conventional order and the expectations of others.	Stage 3 Good-child orientation: Orientation to gaining approval and to pleasing and helping others. Conformity to stereotypical images of majority and natural-role behavior; judgment by intentions. Stage 4 Authority-and-maintaining-social-order orientation: Orientation to doing duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake. Regard for earned expectations of others.

[a]Research data indicate that most teenagers and adults (67% for the two groups combined) stabilize moral-judgment thinking at Stage 3/4 on the Kohlberg scale (Sprinthall & Sprinthall, 1974).

Figure 2 (continued)

Stages of Moral Growth: Kohlberg

Basis of moral judgment	Stage of development
Postconventional Level III: Moral value resides in conformity by the self to shared or sharable standards, rights, or duties.	Stage 5 Contractual-legalistic orientation: Recognition of an arbitrary element or starting point in rules or expectations for the sake of agreement. Duty defined in terms of contract, general avoidance of violation of the will or rights of others, and majority will and welfare. Stage 6 Conscience or principle orientation: Orientation to actually ordained social rules; to principles of choice involving appeal to logical universality and consistency; to conscience as a directing agent; to mutual respect and trust.

Research has shown that the level of moral-judgment thinking tends to lag slightly behind the general stage of intellectual development. Thus, while almost 50% of adolescents in this country do reach formal, abstract thought, only about 30% reach Stage 5 in moral judgment on the Kohlberg scale. This is understandable, when we realize that problems of social justice are more complex, more subjective, and more personally involving than general abstract thinking. Also, as is perhaps obvious in these days of post-Watergate morality, educational experience in responding to general moral questions usually is quite limited. Schooling has tended to avoid direct interaction with questions of social justice and values problems.

Society at large has also eschewed such questions, usually under the guise of either a narrow-minded, literal moralism or, more likely, an atheoretical pragmatism. In Kohlberg's view, based on his findings, all humans think about social justice, pondering such questions as the meaning of human experience, how to distinguish right from wrong, the conditions under which one helps another human being. But the systems of thought differ significantly, depending on the individual's stage of development.

As we examine the nature of the educational experience in our programs we shall see how questions of social justice are inevitably raised by the nature of the helping relationship

in counseling, cross-age teaching, and child-development courses. There is an obvious relationship among questions of moral judgment and questions concerning the meaning of helping, empathy, positive regard for other humans, and their interdependence. Higher stages of moral growth require role taking and genuine empathy toward others. Once again we make the same point that too often schooling assumes development of moral judgment but does not deliberately seek to promote it. Action learning programs such as Deliberate Psychological Education, however, are being designed as a means of stimulating growth in moral judgment and action.

Ego Development

Loevinger and Wessler (1970) have created a framework to comprehend stages of ego development, based on extensive field interviews. Their perception of ego as a master trait of personal growth is similar to the theories of Gordon Allport and Robert White, among others. Ego is a construct for that part of human personality which acts as an executive, coordinating and choosing activities. Loevinger and Wessler's work suggests that at different stages of development the ego behaves in distinctly different patterns. At higher stages it functions more adequately--takes in more aspects of a given situation, views problems with greater complexity, and selects from a larger variety of possible actions. As Figure 3 indicates, there are qualitative differences to the

Figure 3

Some Milestones of Ego Development: Loevinger and Wessler

Stage	Code	Impulse control, character development	Interpersonal style	Conscious preoccupations	Cognitive style
Presocial	1-1		Autistic	Self vs. nonself	
Symbiotic	1-2	Impulsive; fear of retaliation	Symbiotic; receiving; dependent; exploitative	Bodily feelings, especially sexual and aggressive	Stereotype; conceptual confusion
Self-protective	▲	Fear of being caught; externalizing blame; opportunistic	Wary; manipulative; exploitative	Self-protection; wishes; things; advantage; control	
Conformist	1-3	Conformity to external rules; shame, guilt for breaking rules	Belonging; helping; superficial niceness	Appearance; social acceptability; banal feelings, behavior	Conceptual simplicity; stereotypes; clichés
(Transition)	(1-3/4)	(a transition stage)			
Conscientious	1-4	Self-evaluated standards; self-criticism, guilt for consequences; long-term goals	Intensive; responsible; mutual concern for communication	Differentiated feelings; motives for behavior; self-respect; achievements; traits; expression	Conceptual complexity; idea of patterning

Figure 3 (continued)

Some Milestones of Ego Development: Loevinger and Wessler

Stage	Code	Impulse control, character development	Interpersonal style	Conscious preoccupations	Cognitive style
Autonomous	1-5	Add[a]: Coping with conflicting inner needs	Add[a]: Respect for autonomy	Vividly conveyed feelings; integration of physiological and psychological; psychological causation of behavior, development; role conception; self-fulfillment; self in social context	Increased conceptual complexity; complex patterns; toleration for ambiguity; broad scope; objectivity
Integrated	1-6	Add[a]: Reconciling inner conflicts; renunciation of unattainable	Add[a]: Cherish individuality	Add[a]: Identity	

[a]Means add the following to the description applying to the previous level. From Loevinger & Wessler, 1970.

various stages, each one building on the previous stage, at higher levels of differentiation and integration.

Research has indicated that most teenagers are classed in Loevinger and Wessler's Stages 1-3 and 1-3/4, which means that the system teenagers employ to understand their own experience involves the characteristics of these stages. The similarity to Kohlberg's stages of moral development is obvious; Kohlberg's Stage 3 is like Loevinger's Stages 1-3 and 1-3/4. According to the Kohlberg and Loevinger schemes, the major preoccupations of the adolescent ego are conformity for its own sake, superficial niceness, the importance of appearance, social acceptability, and the use of stereotypical thinking. These findings also cross-validate the earlier mentioned classic research on adolescence by Coleman (1961). Loevinger and Wessler, however, provide a broader framework, since they chart the nature and structure of higher stages. The educational objectives necessary to stimulate adolescent ego development to move beyond Stages 1-3 and 1-3/4 then become apparent. In other words, we can specifically define ego-development objectives to promote self-evaluation; mutuality; intensive, responsible concern for others; communication; differentiated feelings; and the understanding of complex human motives. These are all aspects of Stage 1-4 and the groundwork for Stage 1-5.

Construct of Personal Development: Erikson and Elkind

As indicated earlier, Erikson (1959) has viewed adolescence as involving the stage task of identity formation versus identity diffusion. We will not repeat his position here except to underscore the importance that Erikson places upon the need for broad experience as a mechanism for growth. His famous concept of moratorium, however, does not mean a period of time in which a teenager merely floats around in a magical process of finding the "self." The adolescent needs broad and significant experience, not episodes, which he can examine and reflect upon in order to gain self-knowledge, according to Erikson.

Elkind (1970) has commented tellingly on the nature of personal growth during adolescence. If we accept the idea that adolescence is the appropriate developmental time to consider personal questions such as values, then we must also accept one other aspect of adolescence as a developmental stage: the emergence of the egocentric mode. In our view, if this aspect is not acknowledged, it will raise havoc with any educational curriculum designed to influence the personal domain.

Piaget indicated that when a person advances from one developmental stage to the next, a special transition point occurs before he fully comprehends the new stage. He then

shifts within the new stage to egocentric concerns. Piaget called the transitional phase a tendency to egocentric thinking--a shift in modes of thought to focus on the self. Thus a child at the sensorimotor level starts in that stage egocentrically. Elkind (1967) showed that even in the first year of life a baby progresses through the sensorimotor stage from an egocentric position to a more differentiated view of self and the world (called decentering). Similarly, during the elementary years children leave the sensorimotor stage and enter a period called concrete operations. They can classify objects, combine properties, and perform similar tasks. However, as Elkind (1967) noted, "This system of concrete operations...which lifts the school-age child to new heights of thought, nonetheless lowers him to new depths of egocentrism" (p. 1028). This was demonstrated indelibly when elementary-age pupils took positions on certain issues and then were so wedded personally to their views that they refused to change them in the face of overwhelming contradictory evidence. The egocentric mode tends to encourage early perceptual closure on problems and only gradually subsides as the child enters the new stage more fully and confronts enough new experiences to give up egocentric thought.

The same sequence probably occurs among teenagers. Pupils leave concrete operations and enter the stage of formal operations during adolescence, a step up the developmental

scale. Then they may shift sideways to egocentric modes once again.

From the standpoint of a curriculum designed to promote personal/psychological growth during adolescence, this creates special difficulties. The shift upward from concrete to formal operations provides the opening to help adolescents learn who they are. Not only does the stage provide that opportunity, but also some evidence indicates (at least indirectly from Kohlberg's work on moral development) that if growth experiences do not take place during that stage, the individual ceases any further development. At this point in adolescent development, then, it seems more than appropriate to consider a curriculum in psychological education. Emergence from concrete thought to formal operations signals a growth change that almost beckons for a responsive curriculum designed to deal with new sets of issues at the new stage.

When designing curricula, we must be concerned with this second aspect of development during adolescence, the shift sideways to egocentric thought. In particular we should create conditions that do not encourage further movement to egocentric thinking. The problem is how to develop procedures and experiences which will help an adolescent move from the limits of egocentric thinking to a more differentiated and integrative mode. It is interesting to note that the emergence of relativistic thinking during adolescence can promote

egocentrism. Anyone who has worked with teenagers, especially those from so-called sophisticated middle-class communities, is forcefully struck by the amount of self-centered relativism. To "do your own thing" can be in practice a justification for a hands-off, laissez-faire view that encourages privatism under the guise of individuality.

Elkind has noted that egocentric thinking in adolescence causes youth to become preoccupied with themselves--with the uniqueness of their appearance, feelings, and ideas. Their self-consciousness derives in part from the belief that they are the only ones who have ever experienced such feelings and that others are as totally concerned about them as they are. "This complex of beliefs in the uniqueness of his [the adolescent's] feelings and of his immortality might be called a personal fable, a story which he tells himself and which is not true" (Elkind, 1967, p. 1031).

The educational problem is thus particularly clear. It might seem appropriate to develop programs that allow adolescents, as they enter the period of formal operations, to focus on their new abilities to think abstractly about themselves, their ability to differentiate their own mental constructions from those of others, and their concern somehow to put these new parts of themselves all together. Such programs would make sense because of the shift upward from the previous stage. However, the paradox becomes evident if the

programs used lock the adolescent into the egocentric mode rather than deliberately aim to lead him out of it. A program for personal/psychological education thus must take into account both aspects of development if it is to promote psychological growth.

Summary

From a variety of perspectives we can now see how the objectives of educational programs can be viewed in developmental terms. Our attempt to list such objectives is shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4

Psychological or Affective Objectives for
Proposed Curriculum in Individual and Human Development

To enable the individual:

- To listen to other people--to their ideas and to their feelings.
- To identify and attend to feelings--to subjective reactions in general.
- To evaluate others accurately and efficiently.
- To understand himself--who he is at a given time.
- To express personal feelings.
- To be spontaneous and creative.
- To respond to other people's feelings.
- To relate to others--to have more complex, more profound interpersonal relations.
- To act in behalf of a personal value.
- To perceive and to articulate who he wants to become.
- To begin to change in the directions he chooses. Ways to formulate personal problems and to make personal decisions must be taught.
- To formulate a set of personal meanings, a personal philosophy.
- To personalize the issues which concern him (e.g., communication with others, college or job choice, drugs). The individual begins to form judgments concerning the type of life he wants to lead: Who am I? What do I stand for?

Each of these objectives relates to the concepts of intellectual-growth stages from Piaget, moral-judgment stages from Kohlberg, ego-development stages from Loevinger and Wessler, and personal-growth stages from Erikson and Elkind. The strands of intellectual, ethical, and personal growth can be seen as separate yet related facets of development which should become the focus of educational experience.

From a historical perspective, of course, these issues are not really new. Education for the whole person has remained an important general goal for the past 70 years. The famous Committee of Ten in 1893 enunciated the need for intellectual and cognitive development through disciplined inquiry. The equally famous Seven Cardinal Principles of the National Education Association in 1918 underscored the need for personal, psychological, and ethical development.

We view the programs outlined in the next section as promising methods of achieving both sets of educational objectives--as development comprehending the cognitive and the affective.

Developmental-Education Programs

We come, finally, to the genuinely original thing we have learned in 6 years of curriculum research--some of the materials and methods which may serve to evoke and direct a truly educative development. The most important point supporting

the theoretical argument for developmental education is that it is practicable. That is, we have reasonable evidence now that it is feasible through education to stimulate human development as modern psychology understands it. No one group of developmental educators can do it all, but the creation and testing of the educational prototypes are feasible.

What is the evidence? Let us refer first to a series of studies which document discrete effects on aspects of development--primarily moral and ego. These studies include those initiated at Harvard by Mosher and Sprinthall (1971) and their students: Atkins (1972), Dowell (1971), Greenspan (1974), Griffin (1972), Katz (1972), Mager (1972); the research of Kohlberg (1973) and his associates: Blatt (1970), Hickey (1972), Scharf (1973); Mosher and his students at Boston University: Felton (1974), Grimes (1974), Lorish (1974), Mackie (1974), Paolitto (1975), Stanley (1975), Sullivan (1975); Sprinthall and his students at Minnesota: Brock (1974), Erickson (1973), Hurt (1974), Rustad (1974), Schaffer (1974); Beck, Sullivan and Taylor at Toronto (1972); plus numerous studies in progress.

The estimates or measures of development used have included the Kohlberg moral dilemmas; the Loevinger Ego Development Test; the Rest Defining Issues Test; the Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder Conceptual Systems Test; William Perry's measure of intellectual development; interviews with students;

thematic and structural analysis of journals; and classroom-climate inventories. On these measures the studies provide significant evidence of the effect of education on moral reasoning and ego development in children, adolescents, and young adults.

There is replication of what has been found. For example, Dowell (1971), Erickson (1973), Rustad (1974), and Sullivan (1975) all found significant effects on both moral reasoning and ego development of high school students taking various courses in psychological and moral education. Dowell (1971), Griffin (1972), Sprinthall (1971), and Felton (1974) taught adolescents to counsel and found he experience to have a significant effect on their development. Blatt (1970), Grimes (1974), and Paolitto (1975) established that it is practicable to stimulate the moral reasoning of elementary and junior high school students.

Somewhat less extensive curriculum development has been directed toward young adults. Hurt (1974) found significant increases in moral reasoning among juniors and seniors in college. Kohlberg and Gilligan (1973) reported similar effects with Harvard University undergraduates. Further studies now under way include Whiteley's research at the University of California at Irvine on the effects of living and participating in a "just" university residence community and Santa Luca's study with junior college women in Boston.

As the data from these studies show, many of the classes stimulate similar shifts in moral/ethical and psychological/personal development. The scores of the Kohlberg tests show a consistent shift from Stage 3 to Stage 4. The Loevinger results also indicate a shift from Stage 1-3 to Stages 1-3/4 and 1-4, from wary and self-protecting to more trusting, openly communicative, self-respecting and complex in thought process. Essentially, this is a shift from other-directedness to the beginnings of a more integrated, inner-reliant, and less egocentric stage. The Kohlberg results, while not so dramatic, statistically confirmed the shift trend. Pupils moved from Stage 3 toward Stage 4. While the content of those stages is analogous to the Loevinger and Wessler construct, it is much more difficult to move through an entire stage in the Kohlberg system: It usually takes teenagers 2 or 3 years to move from Stage 3 to Stage 4, and even then a substantial minority never make it past Stage 3. Thus the smaller quantitative shift in the Kohlberg results may well be more significant theoretically.

Certainly the changes are internally consistent across all these studies. In many of these school courses, the pupils participated in social roles such as teacher, counselor, interviewer, and child-care helpers. Such participation would thus seem requisite for growth. In the regular or control classes the pupils essentially remained just that--

pupils. The learning was more traditional and passive. Apparently, active social-role taking on the part of adolescents represents a promising method of stimulating cognitive structural growth.

As we noted earlier, one of Dewey's basic assumptions is the concept of qualitatively different systems of thinking. Growth and development are marked by a series of stages, each more comprehensive and complex than the previous one. Teenagers' structural changes toward Stage 4 thinking on questions of social justice represent an important step to higher-order complexity, especially vis-à-vis questions of empathy. Pupils making this shift were no longer so concerned over what the leading crowd might think or do; rather, they gained an increasing ability to genuinely understand other people's perspectives--an ability to feel at an experiential level what others might be confronting in their own lives. Similarly, the shifts in ego development represent a higher-order structural change implying greater differentiation (i.e., seeing and understanding at a more complex level).

One can summarize the achievements of developmental education thus far: First, the volume of research on the developmental effects of various curricula is expanding quickly. Obviously, the research is far from complete or definitive; it is both heuristic and overly dependent on doctoral dissertations. We know most how to educate for

moral and ego development (among the several strands of human development) in preadolescence, adolescence, and young adulthood. Stimulation of these two basic strands of development is practicable. The Biological Sciences Curriculum Study project (1974) may yield data on whether this 3-year curriculum, at least, can stimulate movement from concrete to formal operations at the junior high school level. The variety of studies of moral education using the Kohlberg instrument, a cognitive developmental measure, are the only present indicators that it may be possible to "teach" people to think in more complex ways. Our intuition is that this will be the acid test of developmental education. Incidentally, experimental, although by no means educationally definitive, studies indicate that stimulating the development of formal operational thinking through systematic intervention is extremely difficult (Kuhn, 1974; Schwebel, Note 4). Interestingly enough, similar statements were made by developmental psychologists about both moral and ego development before the intensive educational interventions reported here were undertaken. (We hasten to reiterate an earlier point--that the existing curricula's claims of teaching children to think are themselves questionable.)

Groundbreaking research in the area of education for aesthetic, vocational, and physical development remains to be done. In some instances the requisite developmental theory

is lacking. The need for hard thinking and hard educational development is very clear here.

The further development of children, adolescents, and young adults is easiest (no "pure" development is easy) to effect by education when it is time for that development to occur normally. Grimes's (1974) study illustrates this point. All sixth-grade children in the experimental class moved from preconventional to conventional moral reasoning as a result of a course in moral education shared by their mothers; the age span of 11 to 13 is the normal time for this stage transition to occur. The Grimes research (as well as the research of Felton, 1974, and Stanley, 1975) also underscores the importance of conveying to parents, as the primary educators of their children, a knowledge of human development and how to support it by education. By contrast, education is most difficult and requires the most intensive interaction with those whose development has been arrested (see Hickey, 1972; Lorish, 1974; Paolitto, 1975; and Scharf, 1973). But this is hardly surprising, given the literature of therapy, corrections, and remedial education.

What we are able to learn about stimulating development by education is limited in part by a paucity of valid measures (i.e., instruments which can register the emergence of more complex ways of thinking about logical propositions, moral obligations, personal identity, or an enlarging social

conscience). The complexity and cost of administering some of the available measures are further handicaps. Other outcomes of the variety of curricula being tested are clearly significant: For example, adolescents can learn to counsel or teach as well as many professionals and, in the process, mature morally and socially. They can also create genuine student self-government, become skillful in conducting and participating in democratic groups, and in so doing acquire higher-stage moral reasoning.

Of special importance is that we are learning which educational experiences are particularly appropriate to produce décalage or consolidation in development at a given period in the individual's life and to ensure transition to higher stages of moral reasoning or ego development. We also are beginning to understand the necessary consecutiveness in these experiences. For example, we know that moral development is caused by several factors: (a) exposure to higher-stage arguments and intellectual interaction with them; (b) increased empathy, learning to understand how others think and feel, and enlarged social perspective and concern; and (c) action on behalf of chosen moral and social goals.

What educational experiences, then, may be expected to stimulate moral development? One category is the discussion of moral dilemmas. Current curriculum examples include written material (e.g., Blatt, 1970), filmstrips (e.g., Guidance

Associates, 1977), and films (Learning Corporation of America, 1975). A second kind of generic educational experience is role taking. Curriculum opportunities providing role-taking experiences include learning to counsel (e.g., Dowell, 1971; Felton, 1974; Lorish, 1974; Rustad, 1974); acting as moral educators (Sullivan, 1975); and participating in Paolitto's (1975) role-taking curriculum for the junior high school. A third category includes experiences in social service and social action and the study of the justice structure of institutions. Here the focus might be on institutions such as the school, the family, the courts, and government, as well as on experiences in rule making, creating fairer institutions, and democratic participation. Experimental curricula providing such experiences include that of Sullivan (1975), in which adolescents taught moral education classes to younger children and formed a high school disciplinary appeals board; Biological Sciences Curriculum Study (1974) human sciences units on "Rules" and "What's Happening to Me?"; the curricula in social and political action by Newmann, Bertocci, and Lundsness (Note 5) under development at the University of Wisconsin; democratic high school experiments in Cambridge and Brookline, Massachusetts, and in Pittsburgh; and Stanley's (1975) program on the justice structure of the family as a focus for parent and adolescent education.

It is now possible, on the basis of this growing body of

research, to suggest what educational experiences are most appropriate to a specific stage of moral development, and how these experiences may be sequenced for progressive growth. For example, to stimulate development from preconventional to conventional moral reasoning in the fifth and sixth grades, Grimes's (1974) data suggest the discussion of moral dilemmas, creating and role-playing original dilemmas, and training children's mothers as moral educators. Paolitto (1975) used a variety of imaginative role-taking experiences for the same purpose with junior high school students. Dowell (1971) and many others, who taught adolescents to counsel, and Lorish (1974), who trained prisoners to be peer counselors for other inmates, argue that teaching people to counsel others may be the single most powerful educational experience presently available to stimulate conventional moral thinking, empathy, and role taking.

Stage-appropriate educational experiences include consolidation of conventional moral reasoning; discussion of dilemmas; the study of law, constitutions, governance, and fairness of institutions; and involvement in social service and social-political action. In order to stimulate development to principled moral reasoning, two kinds of educational experience have been demonstrated as critical: The first is systematic experience in rule making and the democratic governance of classrooms, alternative high schools, or under-

graduate residences. The second is participation in moral discussion (Kohlberg & Gilligan, 1971) on normative philosophy or topics in ethics and moral philosophy with high school seniors (e.g., Beck et al., 1972).

So the picture of what we know is a mixed one. More extensive curricula are now being researched. In particular we refer to the "just" community, or democracy-as-education experiments at the high school level in Cambridge and Brookline, Massachusetts; in Pittsburgh; and at the University of California. Teachers and counselors are being trained in developmental psychology and in the creation and teaching of developmental curricula in Brookline, Cambridge, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, and Tacoma. In Brookline this teacher education in moral development is being extended from the elementary school level through adult education (Mosher, Note 6). In Tacoma it will involve over 3 years of developing and testing moral-education curricula for elementary school through senior high, the training of a large number of teachers, and the dissemination of the programs to other school districts in the state of Washington.

In sum, substantial educational development is under way. It is incomplete, fractionated, promising, and as vital a movement as currently exists anywhere in American public education. From this emergent picture, then, we can reach some tentative conclusions and recommendations.

Summary and Recommendations

McCloskey and Kleinbard (1974) of the National Commission on Resources for Youth characterized the average teaching-learning experience for teenagers in developmental-education programs as "over-stimulated and under-used." In the variety of exemplary programs, however, they found singular exceptions. Such programs seemingly reversed the usual educational assumptions during adolescence and succeeded in promoting healthy psychological and personal growth. The authors identified eight characteristics of these outstanding programs:

1. They fill genuine needs for both adolescents and society, involving students in a task recognized as important by both young people and society.

2. They offer active learning through experience--actual observation and involvement--in an age of spectatorship. This is a natural way to learn and is especially suited to today's youth.

3. They offer challenge, providing youth a chance to do something not only meaningful but also difficult. They demand from adolescents a full expenditure of mind and spirit.

4. They promote maturity and responsibility, stimulating growth on several levels--developmental, interpersonal, and cognitive. The participants learn to make decisions, share in governance, and perform leadership roles.

5. They relate theory to practice and demand more learning to guide further practice.

6. They give adolescents a glimpse of the real options available in the adult world. Participants find out about the world of work and about their own interests and potentials.

7. They represent delicate working partnerships between youth and adults, collaborative models in which each group offers what it uniquely can.

8. They offer a community experience, a sense of belonging to an extended family and the exhilaration that comes from being associated with significant others.

Approaching this summary from a somewhat different point of view, the programs can be viewed in terms of human roles, as in the following outline:

The adolescent as an adult: Adolescents can learn and perform effectively in many significant adult roles such as teaching, counseling, and helping with child care. Learning to perform such functions stimulates intellectual and moral/ethical/psychological development. Significant social role taking affects moral maturity.

The adolescent as a philosopher: Teenagers can learn to think through significant values questions, critically analyze general and personal values clashes, and discern the ethical implications from such analysis. The adolescent can be viewed as a moral philosopher. By learning to examine such values questions, teenagers can attain higher levels of moral and cognitive growth. They can also learn to lead and teach values discussions.

The adolescent as a democrat: Teenagers can learn to participate in "just" communities, create democratic rule systems, distinguish between laws and principles, etc. Such

participation (genuine participatory democracy) stimulates psychological/ethical maturity.

The adolescent as a psychologist: Teenagers can learn to analyze human behavior; understand the multiple causes of behavior; master human caring skills; differentiate thoughts from feelings, the subjective from the objective, etc. Such experiences help to induce personal, intellectual, and ethical growth.

One final point: There is a single important distinguishing quality to all of the successful developmental-education programs noted above. Each provides the pupils with a relatively continuous sequence of experiences. The programs, courses, and readings are not designed as a brief educational supplement or one-shot experience to liven up a class late on a Friday afternoon. Occasionally there is a confusion between the sequenced developmental education programs and the so-called Human Potential Movement. The developmental programs are designed as regular 1- or 2-term courses, usually as a major component of humanities and social studies or even as an entire learning sequence. This is substantially different from, and not to be confused with, the large number of brief, episodic, and mostly single-session psychological games and gimmicks currently available in the educational marketplace. So far as we can tell, there is no research evidence at all attesting to the effectiveness of

these tricks in the bags of psychological hucksters. While observation indicates that a specific simulation may indeed create momentary interest and turn some students on, it should not be confused with sequenced educational programs designed to encourage developmental growth. Our experience has been that significant change is immune to a momentary psychological simulation in the classroom. Certainly a basic source of human complexity and strength is the ability to overlook the superficial. We have also found that the ability of teenagers to engage in and learn from the real questions of human experience is a further source of strength.

In a sense the conclusions are obvious. The work in psychological/ethical/ego development is indicative of the possible. Specific school programs--developed, tested, and evaluated in real-world settings--provide consistent evidence of positive outcomes. Such working examples as the Sprinthall-Mosher programs of stimulating growth through adult role taking, the Beck-Sullivan programs of promoting ethical/cognitive development through an in-depth values curriculum, the Kohlberg et al. programs of moral-dilemma discussions, and the participatory-democracy procedures of the "just" high school are more than armchair theories or ephemeral paradigms.

The goals of such programs also appear as an important educational synthesis. In simplified terms, the 1950s can be

considered the era of intellectual objectives for schooling. The so-called Brunerian revolution, combined with Conant's report on this country's high schools, created a watershed for a major emphasis on conceptual development. The 1960s, on the other hand, represented almost a backlash. Personal learning, humane development, education for personal relevancy represented by the so-called humanistic or third-force revolution became a new focus. In our view, neither position can or should become the exclusive objective. In everyday language, the developmental-education programs seek to stimulate the mind and the heart, the brain and the soul, the intellect and the character of each pupil.

To promote and stimulate the very development of such programs is the point at hand. In this vein, a series of brief recommendations merit consideration:

1. Since current programs are already emergent, initial developmental funding of huge amounts is not required. At this point, relatively small supplemental grants are all that may be necessary to provide impetus for the further elaboration of developmental programs. A funding scale such as that of the Great Society era would be a major mistake, since it would tempt programs to expand too quickly. The success of the programs mentioned in this paper has come largely from small-scale, carefully evaluated, and closely monitored projects. We suggest that such work continue, with limited funds

available for the current promising projects in Brookline/Cambridge, Pittsburgh, Minneapolis, and Irvine, as well as others. It is noteworthy that each project represents an atypical combination of university faculty, on-line classroom teachers, graduate students experienced in classroom problems, and researchers, all working in school sites. This mixed-team approach, although fraught with problems, does seem to produce real-world programs.

There is a need to continue and expand work in the teacher-education framework. To create new programs in the form of curriculum materials designed for consecutive experience would fail unless requisite work is started in teacher education. It is an illusion to try to build teacher-proof materials. The instructional strategies necessary to make any program work need to be systematically translated into a model teacher-education system. Both in-service and pre-service teacher education require attention. The teacher as a developmental educator must play an instructional role more complex than that of the traditional teacher.

3. There is a need for programmatic development in the area of educational administration. If we are successful in creating an articulated set of curriculum materials and can indicate how on-line teachers themselves can be taught, we shall still need a third component of change. For programs to take root and grow, school principals and assistant

principals (the on-line educational policymakers) need not only to understand but also to contribute to the programs. The "just" high school, for example, fundamentally alters all the relationships in a school building--among teachers, pupils, and principal. So-called action-learning or adult role-taking programs affect scheduling across the board as well as relationships both within the school and vis-à-vis the community. The educational administrator becomes a key figure for leadership, staff development, and new formulations. When the Kohlberg group worked successfully with a prison system, the lives and activities of the guards and the warden were as fundamentally changed as were those of the prisoners. (This example is not simply an inversion of the familiar schools-are-like-prisons simile.)

4. The community-school relationship needs further study and programmatic development. Some of the promising work in parent education and in educating teenagers for parenting is to the point. Obviously parents can become significant positive resources to promote the human, ethical, and psychological development of their own children. It is also obvious that adolescents can learn effective child-care techniques and child-development principles. This line of investigation itself needs further study.

5. There is a continuing need for research on the exact nature of the relation between behavior and ethical stages,

as well as the consequences of developmental experiences. The context and impact of democracy as educative probably will always defy exact specification; our present successive approximations are still very tentative.

6. At the broadest level is the need to explore the basic conception of development as a whole. We noted earlier that we have a series of significant perspectives from Piaget, Kohlberg, Loevinger, Erikson, et al. Yet this is only part of the story. Other strands of development are noticeably absent--emotional, aesthetic, vocational, among others. The education of each child should not automatically exclude entire areas of human growth simply because we have not gotten around to them yet. The integration of these multiple aspects of growth then emerges as a definition of education for the child as a whole.

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WHERE WE SHOULD GO FROM HERE IN DEVELOPMENTAL MORAL EDUCATION: COMMENTS ON NORMAN A. SPRINTHALL AND RALPH L. MOSHER'S PAPER

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Sprinthall and Mosher's paper is seen as a helpful introduction to developmental moral education but lacking in the specificity and detail needed to guide future research in the field. Their paper serves as a springboard for recommendations organized around seven areas of concern: (a) defining what is already known from research in developmental moral education; (b) assessing the relative effectiveness of different teaching approaches to stimulating moral development; (c) developing new methods of evaluating developmental moral education; (d) designing and testing new approaches to teacher training; (e) exploring the contribution of parents to moral development; (f) determining what kinds of moral-education experiences are optimal at different developmental levels; and (g) developing a convincing explanation of why progress to Kohlberg's higher stages of moral reasoning is a valid goal for moral and citizenship education.

In responding to Sprinthall and Mosher's paper, I am tempted to steal a line from the British philosopher R. S. Peters (1975) (who borrowed it from somebody else). Peters said that Kohlberg was like the Venus de Milo: What there was of him was excellent. The same, I think, is true of the paper by Sprinthall and Mosher. It is informative and persuasive as an overview of what developmental education is, why developmental education is necessary, some of the ways in which it can be carried out, and what the field needs in the

future. Sprinthall and Mosher's recommendations are all very wise counsel--to build on the base of efforts already under way; to pay greater attention to teacher education, the role of school administration, and the part that parents can play in the child's moral education; to explore further the relationship between moral reasoning and behavior; and to anchor moral education in a curriculum for the development of the whole person. But at the end of the paper, I found myself wanting to know much more, wishing I could buttonhole these two respected moral educators and dig deeper into their experience.

What, concretely, have they done in projects conceived and executed under the banner of developmental education? What did the teachers do? What did the students do? What were the outcomes, and how did they differ from what was expected? What worked best? What have been the problems in the past, the mistakes to avoid in the future? What questions have been raised by their interventions? If they had all the money they wanted for research on developmental moral education, how would they spend it? Which questions would they try to answer first?

What is needed, then, so that all of us can frame good questions and recommendations for the research agenda, is a clear sense of what has been tried and what has been found. From the perspective of that need, Sprinthall and Mosher do

not tell us enough. For example, they cite studies suggesting that three kinds of experiences stimulate moral development: (a) discussion of moral dilemmas; (b) activities that involve role taking, such as counseling; and (c) experiences in social action, service, or creating and participating in a fair and democratic social arrangement. Again, this only whets one's curiosity. How much moral development was stimulated by these different kinds of experiences? Over how long a period of time? What procedures were used? Is one kind of experience more effective than another? By what criteria? Was there impact on moral behavior as well as on level of reasoning? And so on. I suspect that many readers will feel a need, as I did, for a sharply drawn profile of one or two representative developmental moral-education projects, with findings reported and analyzed in enough detail to enable readers to get a sense of what research should look at next.

My own recommendations for the field of developmental moral education are organized around a series of seven questions.

1. The Need to Know What We Know

The first question is posed at the risk of redundancy: What do we already know, and what remains to be learned? Answering this will require on-the-scene talking to various people involved in moral-education projects, as well as

examining the research reports and data. It will also require firsthand observation of ongoing projects, since the actual phenomenon is always somewhat different from, and richer than, verbal or written representations of it. My guess is that lots of good hunches about what to do and study next in moral education will come from outside people doing some astute firsthand observing--for instance, in one of Sprinthall's counseling courses or one of Mosher and Kohlberg's "just" community schools.

Recommendation: Past and present developmental moral-education projects should be mined for all the knowledge and researchable questions they will yield.

2. The Need to Assess Different Models and Strategies

What is the relative effectiveness of different educational methods of stimulating moral-stage development? Are they more effective when combined? So far, the Kohlbergian interventions have produced only modest gains in moral reasoning. In high school social studies projects in Boston and Pittsburgh, for example, only half of the teachers conducting moral discussions were able to stimulate upward stage change in their students over the course of the academic year, and the size of the change was only from one-quarter to one-half a stage (Kohlberg, 1976). Kohlberg reported that classrooms in which stage change occurred were characterized by a greater mix of students at different stages and more teacher use

of "good Socratic probes of reasoning" than were classrooms in which no significant stage change occurred. Were those two factors really what made the difference? If so, can consistent success in advancing moral reasoning be assured by a good mix of stages among students and by substantial teacher probing?

Post hoc explanations of other experimental studies also call for investigation. Sullivan (1975), for example, reported that he and his colleagues ran similar moral-reasoning courses in two schools but got stage movement in only one. He suggests that the difference may have been due to the climate of respect for students that prevailed in the first school but was missing in the second. How can respect for students be operationalized and shown to be a necessary condition for effective moral education?

An example of the kind of research that needs to be done is a proposed study to compare two types of moral education at the elementary school level, "one which uses moral reasoning exclusively, and another which combines moral reasoning with developing ground rules and fostering a sense of community" (Theroux, Note 1). At the secondary level Mosher and Sprinthall (1970) reported that a combination of a moral practicum and reflection on the meaning of the practicum experience produced greater stage change than did either discussion or practicum alone. Is that a consistent phenomenon?

Should discussion of the traditional hypothetical moral dilemmas be dropped from the moral curriculum on the grounds that it is more effective to have students talk about the moral meaning of their real-life practicum experiences? Or are hypothetical dilemmas needed to expose students to important moral issues not likely to be encountered in their present personal lives?

All of these questions reduce to one: What should a teacher do? Advice changes. The early Kohlbergian prescriptions called for the teacher to be a good diagnostician of a student's present moral stage and a skilled facilitator of "plus one" reasoning: "If moral communications are to be effective, the developmental level of the teacher's verbalizations must be one step above the level of the child" (Kohlberg, 1971, p. 42). More recent guidelines from two staffers in the Harvard/Carnegie-Mellon Values Education Project reverse the earlier exhortation: "Teachers should not attempt to categorize individual students at particular stages...." Teachers' skills in communication and group facilitation are more important to a productive discussion of a moral problem than skill in stage interpretation" (Galbraith & Jones, 1976, p. 185). There is no consensus, however; another new book, Moral Development: A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg (Duska & Whelan, 1975), suggests that teachers should try to stage-categorize the responses of their students and even have them

role-play reasoning at the next higher stage. Galbraith, in a review of Duska and Whelan, warned that this approach amounts to "teaching the stages" and "may actually be counterproductive to helping students consider moral problems" (Galbraith, 1976, p. 226). All this is reminiscent of continuing arguments about which educational applications of Piaget are true to his theory; current disputes about methods in moral education also suggest that some distortions may be the inevitable by-product of mass-marketing Kohlberg. But how to tell the distortions? While there does not need to be a party line on "correct Kohlberg," some hard data on what techniques do in fact work in stimulating stage development would help provide an objective basis for deciding what good teaching practice is. Making that judgment should also include a look at the long-term effects of any given approach: Does a shortcut didactic method of getting a student from Stage 3 to Stage 4, for example (assuming this could be done in a didactic manner), undercut in the long run the student's initiative and ability to think for himself?

Another way to address the question of proper pedagogy is to ask what skills an effective moral educator should have. My own belief, based on our experience with preschool and elementary teachers at Project Change in central New York, is that the following seven skills are valuable:

(a) Ability to "apply" the moral stages in two senses--

knowing what kind of moral understanding one can reasonably expect from children in a broad developmental period; and using the developmental stages in setting goals (e.g., a better understanding of fairness) for moral education in the classroom.

(b) Ability to conduct a small-group or whole-class discussion of a real or hypothetical moral issue (including problems open to many solutions as well as two-choice dilemmas) and to help students follow through on group decisions such as "Everybody should do his fair share in clean-up."

(c) Ability to engage a child one to one in a moral dialogue, especially about an incident that arises in the natural daily life of the classroom.

(d) Ability to create the classroom conditions that lead children to become involved in positive moral action, such as cooperative effort (e.g., group projects) or action that benefits another (e.g., peer teaching).

(e) Ability to communicate empathically with children in a way that respects their dignity as persons, fosters mutual respect between teacher and child, and sets a model for children's communication with each other.

(f) Ability to involve children in formulating classroom rules and ability to handle rule violation nonpunitively so that children learn both how their offenses affect others and how they can monitor and improve their own behavior.

(g) Ability to observe and document gains in the moral maturity of individual students and the class as a whole (more on the issue of evaluation later).

Each of these broad competencies involves a set of sub-skills. To run an effective class meeting, for example, one must be able to choose a question children will want to talk about, have good alternative or follow-up questions, reflect or paraphrase individual students' statements, relate different contributions to each other, probe for reasoning behind opinions, pose challenging questions, keep the discussion flexible but on track, and so on. Mastering just this one skill of conducting a good class meeting is obviously no mean feat.

Some of these skills may be more important than others; some may not be directly involved in producing stage change but may be crucial for achieving other kinds of intermediate moral outcomes that ultimately lead to stage change. From a practical standpoint, we really do not need to know the relative contributions of all the different strategies a moral educator might decide to use on the basis of theory, experience, or intuition. What is important, I believe, is for different people in the field to develop at least a tentative conception of what skills good moral educators use, then to help teachers acquire and use those skills, and finally to assess their impact on students. We need to know how varying

approaches differ in their effects on moral thinking and behavior. In addition to this kind of broad-gauged research, more focused studies could be carried out to test the relative effects of particular disputed teaching strategies--such as offering higher-stage arguments rather than simply facilitating group discussion. Studies could also compare the effectiveness of a single strategy, such as moral discussions, with its effectiveness in combination with others believed to be important (e.g., providing opportunities for cooperative learning).

Recommendation: Support should be provided for conceptualizing and testing different models of developmental moral education in order to determine their relative effectiveness in promoting moral-stage advance. Support should also be provided for studies focused on assessing the relative effectiveness of particular teaching strategies.

3. The Need for New Approaches to Evaluation

How should developmental moral-education programs be evaluated? Research on the comparative effectiveness of different approaches will be seriously inadequate without the use of new strategies for assessment. Since change in stage of moral reasoning is very slow, with a full-stage change taking 1, 2, or more years, vertical moral-stage development is clearly not a sensitive enough indicator of whether a moral-education program is effective. What should the evaluator do who faces that problem?

One strategy is to measure other kinds of stage progress.

Kohlberg (1976) claims that a given stage of thinking develops first in the logical/physical realm (e.g., "What makes an object sink?"), then in the realm of social cognition (e.g., "What is someone likely to do in a given situation?"), and last in the moral arena (e.g., "What should the person do?"). If this scheme is valid, a moral-education program will have its impact first on logical thinking, later on social understanding, and still later on prescriptive moral judgment. Evaluation should therefore take into account all three kinds of thinking.

A second approach is to try to assess what I would call horizontal moral development, an important but neglected goal in moral education. If you were interested in students' horizontal moral growth, you would ask the following kinds of questions: To what extent do they use their abstract moral-reasoning abilities in dealing with real events in day-to-day living? To what extent do they see the moral dimensions of a situation? That is, do they consider whether something is right or wrong, fair or unfair, helpful or hurtful? To what extent do they think of the consequences of their actions for others?

This line of questioning does not yet inquire how people actually behave; it asks only if, in making the large and small decisions of life, they even call into play their powers of moral reasoning. A common view of human behavior is

that people go ahead and do what they want and then rationalize afterwards, if necessary. Other observation suggests further that people may deliberately put their moral judgment on the shelf in large areas of their lives. To read David Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest (1969), for example, is to confront a group of highly intelligent government officials, many of whom surely had an equally high capacity for moral reasoning, who made decision after decision about the Vietnam war on the basis of political and military, but never moral, considerations. On a less dramatic scale, there is the child who agrees in a class meeting that it is important to consider other people's feelings but later joins in excluding a classmate from a game on the playground. It seems clear that people differ in the extent to which they see the world through moral lenses; in the extent to which they make connections between moral principles and relevant situations. Evaluation strategy must try to measure this difference among individuals, and pedagogy needs to determine how to help people not only to develop their moral reasoning but also to use it in processing the myriad aspects of their social experience.

A second aspect of horizontal development depends on the first. To what extent can we expect people to act upon what they believe to be right or just, assuming that they comprehend the situation in moral terms? For educators, as for the

general public, behavior is the bottom line. For the last 6 years, discipline has headed the list of concerns for both students and parents in the Gallup poll of attitudes toward education. Evaluation should tackle this problem head on. What is the impact of a moral-education program on students' demonstrated respect for rules and the rights of others? What is its effect on the incidence of school violence? on vandalism? on theft? on positive moral behaviors such as taking responsibility for improving one's own behavior, or acting in the interest of another person or the class or the school?

A focus on moral behavior as one dimension of horizontal development suggests a solution to the problem of how to evaluate developmental moral-education programs in the face of the slow stage change. There is a good theoretical and empirical basis for believing that when individuals are engaged in the process of positive and varied social interactions, the product of moral stage development will eventually follow. We need to develop a theory-based instrument for assessing the degree to which a classroom or school reflects the process believed to foster moral development. To what extent are persons participating in the making of fair rules and other decisions affecting group and individual interests? How much interest do students demonstrate in moral issues? Do they actively participate in discussions?

How much opportunity is there for free exchange of perspectives? Do teachers and children speak and listen to each other with mutual respect and understanding? How well can students collaborate on a task? What chances do they have to contribute to the welfare of others? Is the moral environment perceived as fair?

Moral-process outcomes like these are obviously important in their own right as a yardstick of the efficacy of any approach to moral education. An instrument that taps these process outcomes could also be tested for its validity as a measure of a program's effectiveness in stimulating stage movement. To what extent is the development of these processes predictive of subsequent upward movement on Kohlberg's reasoning scale?

Recommendation: Support should be provided for developing measures other than vertical moral-stage development for evaluating developmental moral-education programs. In particular, that support should be provided for efforts to (a) assess program impact on the stages of logical thinking and social reasoning on which each moral stage builds; (b) evaluate horizontal moral development, defined as applying moral-reasoning capacity to the analysis of real-life moral situations and then behaving in a way that is consistent with one's highest moral reasoning; and (c) develop an instrument to measure moral-process outcomes that are believed to foster moral-stage development, and validate this instrument as a predictor of eventual vertical stage advance in moral reasoning.

4. Teacher-Education Concerns

How should moral educators themselves be educated? The challenge of teacher education looms large. For each skill

that teachers need, for every moral process that they should foster among children, there needs to be a training procedure for developing that skill. Our experience at Project Change leads us to believe that there are no shortcuts. Teacher education will have to practice what it preaches and enable teachers to experience firsthand the educational processes they are expected to provide for their students. If you want teachers who are committed to the values of fairness and mutual respect, let them experience fairness and respect in their own education. If you want teachers who stimulate communication and social collaboration among children, allow them to experience those processes as adult learners. If you want teachers who can help students examine their moral values and actions, then ask teachers to reflect on the origins of their own values; on the moral influences upon their lives, past and present; on the ideals most important to them now; and on how these ideals are expressed in their adult relationships and interactions with children. At this point, the guidelines suggested here are only our beliefs; research is needed to determine their validity as recommendations for teacher education at large.

Research on teacher education might also ask, "What is the relationship between amount of training and teacher success as a moral educator (in terms of both process and stage-change outcomes)? Selman and Lieberman (Note 2) found that

at the primary school level, lay teachers with no training in moral-development theory stimulated as much stage advance in understanding intentions (through filmstrip discussions) as did experienced teachers with training in developmental theory. Does the teacher's theoretical understanding make a difference in some other ways that Selman and Lieberman did not measure? What kind of training experience enables teachers to function creatively, generating new forms and extensions of the moral curriculum based on a deeply internalized understanding of moral processes and goals? What steps constitute a workable sequence in preparing a teacher to be a moral educator? And is the combination of practical experience and reflection that Sprinthall and Mosher report as most effective with students also most effective with teachers?

Recommendation: Support should be provided for developing and testing various approaches to training teachers in the skills of developmental moral education. These should include approaches emphasizing factors such as the teacher's own moral growth and depth of commitment, factors which are likely to make a long-range difference in the quality and extent of what the teacher does as moral educator.

5. Teacher/Parent and School/Home Factors

What contribution can parents make to the child's moral development? We know from the Coleman report (Coleman, Campbell, Hobson, McPartland, Alexander, Weinfeld, & York, 1966) that family background is one of the best predictors of a student's level of academic achievement. We know from the

preschool interventions in the 1960s (Bronfenbrenner, 1972) that working with the mothers of preschool-age children only once a week for 2 hours was as effective in stimulating IQ gains as was having a child in a preschool program 5 days a week. We know that parents can stimulate moral-stage development by discussing values issues with their children (Holstein, 1968). But by and large, the contribution parents can and do make to their children's moral-stage growth is unexplored territory. If a project called for home and school working together to optimize a child's moral development, how much more impact would there be under those circumstances than would occur if the school were working alone? Teachers frequently say that the home environment can undercut their efforts to help children learn appropriate social behavior. If resources were limited, would parent education have a greater effect on children than teacher training? One suspects it would.

What skills does a parent need to be an effective moral educator? How is moral education in the home similar to or different from moral education in the classroom? What training procedures are appropriate for both parents and teachers?

Recommendation: Support should be provided for projects to enhance parents' effectiveness as moral educators. The impact of working with parents alone should be compared with the impact of working with teachers alone. The effectiveness of these separate strategies should be compared with that of a combined home-school effort in moral education.

6. Developmental and Age Considerations

How should strategies for fostering moral growth vary with the child's developmental level? What approaches work best at what stages? How is the process of developmental moral education at the preschool level different from the process at the elementary level? Is it so, as one writer recently claimed, that "discussion does not work very well or for very long with children below the age of 10" and that below this age teachers need to rely more on "the use of models and concrete examples" (Fraenkel, 1976, p. 221)? Is it true, as a critic of Kohlberg asserts, that children's progress to at least conventional-level morality depends on (a) their being taught "specific virtues--specific rules against cheating, lying, and stealing and rules enjoining kindness, cooperation, and thoughtfulness," and on (b) the enforcement of these rules "so they become internalized as dispositions" (Hamm, 1976, p. 3)? Should the methods used to help elementary school children reach Stage 3, for example, differ significantly from the methods used to help secondary students reach Stage 4? What experiences are effective in stimulating the shift away from convention-bound morality toward postconventional moral principles? All these are open questions.

Almost all the interventions to date, as Sprinthall and Mosher's paper reflects, have focused on the moral education

of adolescents. A more balanced distribution of research efforts, spanning the preschool, elementary, and secondary school years, is needed to shed light on the important issue of how education for moral development should change as children grow older.

Recommendation: Support should be provided for moral-education research with preschool and elementary children as well as with secondary school students, with the aim of determining what kinds of experiences are optimal in stimulating moral growth at different developmental levels.

7. Why Try to Get to Higher Stages?

Finally, moral educators espousing a Kohlbergian developmental approach need to work out a satisfactory answer to a root question: What makes the higher moral stages better than the lower stages? Obviously, there is no point in trying to move up the developmental ladder unless the higher steps in the sequence are, in some objective, nonrelative way, superior to the lower ones. Within social science, Kohlberg's claim that "higher is better" has been a subject of vigorous controversy for some time. (For a sample of the debate, see Lickona, 1976.) This is hardly an academic issue. I recently ran a workshop on developmental moral education for a group of philosophers and teacher educators, and the session never even got to talking about classroom applications of developmental theory and research because of the storm of argument ignited by the idea that education should

try to move students to supposedly higher moral stages. Acceptance of the developmental-stage approach to moral education clearly hinges on acceptance of the proposition that the higher stages are better and their attainment should therefore be a long-range educational goal.

Kohlberg (1971) has attempted to explain how the higher stages enable an individual to solve a greater range of moral problems in a rational or just way. Rest (Note 3) has recently contributed significantly to this issue by describing how each higher stage involves a wider conceptualization of social cooperation and produces thinking that is less situation-bound and is capable of handling more complex problems. The job, however, is far from done. Needed are examples--meaningful to teachers, principals, and parents--of tangible ways in which the higher stages better equip a person to deal with moral problems and social relationships in the real world. Needed also is a cogent explanation of why a citizen in a pluralistic, constitutional democracy needs to be able to reason at Stage 4 or 5. How are individual citizenship and the functioning of a democratic society enhanced by higher-stage reasoning? Is there a compelling answer to that question--one that would elicit agreement from persons of varying backgrounds and ideologies?

If in fact there is a developmental-stage hierarchy in the realm of morals as there is in the realm of logical

thinking, and if individuals do reject lower stages in favor of higher ones as they develop, then it should be possible to make a convincing case that persons can indeed become more moral in the way they deal with moral issues in their personal lives and in their role as citizens, and that it is our responsibility as educators to foster that process of moral becoming.

Recommendation: Developmental moral educators should make clear in what ways higher-stage moral reasoning is better than lower-stage reasoning and therefore a desirable goal of moral education for personal and citizenship development.

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A PROMISE OR COMPLETED EDUCATIONAL REVOLUTION? COMMENTS ON NORMAN A. SPRINTHALL AND RALPH L. MOSHER'S PAPER

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The author raises the issue of the fulfillment, as opposed to the promise, of the Kohlbergian Revolution in moral/citizenship education. He argues that developmental educators have not worked through some central tenets crucial to an effective program in citizenship education. For example, the social dynamics of developmental change are poorly understood. Similarly, there are few demonstrations (to date) of the transferability of developmental teaching competences. While developmental education offers both new psychological means and philosophically justified goals to programs in moral/citizenship education, the author believes that certain writers, including Sprinthall and Mosher, may have overstated the accomplishments if not the promise of the Kohlbergian approach.

Sprinthall and Mosher have attempted a much-needed overview of work in the area of developmental education. While they convey a clear portrait of the rationale of developmental education and the recent contributions of this approach, there may be room to suggest some of the frontier R&D issues facing the developmental-education movement. Their paper, it seems to me, emphasizes more clearly what we know and can do (or think we can do) than what we are trying to learn.

Research in moral education, it seems to me, has fallen into five separate but overlapping areas. Each research issue relates to a particular application area and builds

sequentially upon earlier efforts in the field. The first three of these research areas are well defined; the remaining two are only in the beginning stages of conceptualization. Figure 1 outlines this scheme.

Figure 1

Scheme of Moral-Education Research

Research area	Research studies (examples)
Established research domains:	
1. Clinical and experimental moral change	Turiel (1966) Blatt (1975) Sullivan (1975)
2. Developmental décalage	Selman (1975) Dowell (1972) Mosher & Sprinthall (1972)
3. Preconditions of developmental change	Colby (1972) Fritz (1972) Hickey (1972)
Issues at beginning stages of conceptualization:	
4. Ecology of developmental change	
5. Transference of developmental teaching competences	

1. Clinical and Experimental Moral Change

Most of the studies conducted before 1970 might be described as simply seeking to establish that moral change could in fact be induced either experimentally (Turiel, 1966) or clinically (Blatt, 1975) and that the "increases" attained were "developmental" in character (i.e., they represented structural changes in thinking rather than language). For example, the Blatt study (conducted in 1968) demonstrated not only that moral change could be induced, but also that the stage movements followed a stepwise progression and were maintained (compared with controls) over a 2-year period. These basic findings, as Mosher and Sprinthall suggest, have been replicated in more than a dozen studies (e.g., Sullivan, 1975).

2. Develcpmental Décalage

As Mosher and Sprinthall observe, a major breakthrough in the field occurred when Dowell's (1972) study revealed that a peer-counseling curriculum could be as developmentally effective as one using moral discussion. Moreover, the study (for the first time) showed that changes in ego development seemed to accompany shifts in moral reasoning. This led to a series of investigations (e.g., Hickey, 1972; Selman, 1976) on the interconnections among social role taking, ego development, moral development, and interpersonal relationships. These

studies suggest that a legitimate goal for developmental education might include the décalage of existing operations to new tasks (e.g., the application of a new mode of social role taking to interpersonal relationships) as well as the generation of new structures of thought. Sprinthall and Mosher ignore the fact that at this point we cannot measure horizontal décalage in any meaningful way. A beginning research technology is being pioneered by Selman (1976), but he reports that "any educationally useful measure is at least several years away" (Note 1). The creation of such a technology is obviously crucial if serious progress is to be made towards a developmental curriculum emphasizing horizontal décalage as an educational objective.

3. Preconditions of Developmental Change

Another area of concern, also somewhat ignored in the Sprinthall and Mosher paper, deals with the preconditions of developmental change. Colby (1972) and Kuhn (1974) have each reported a necessary but insufficient relationship between logical and moral thinking. This becomes of critical educational importance when we consider, for example, Hickey's (1972) observation that all his Stage 2-to-Stage 3 "changers" (i.e., subjects who moved at least one developmental stage) possessed the low-level formal operational capacity to move

to the next stage. Further research may well indicate other necessary but insufficient relationships between dimensions of social role taking and ego development as well as relationships between moral thought and quality of relationships. These relationships might be crucial to the selection of students for programs in developmental education. They should also contribute significantly to our understanding of the dynamics of both vertical and horizontal developmental change.

These first three research areas may be viewed as established research domains, each with its own literature and traditional findings. Unfortunately, even if they had provided some preliminary answers--which they have not--we still would be a long way from having the necessary research and theory base to conduct truly effective programs in moral education.

Two additional research areas seem to me to hinder a closing of the gap between developmental theory and broad-based educational practice. The first area deals with the problem of the social ecology of moral change; the second involves transferring our developmental educational methods to teachers and laymen. Unless we understand more clearly the dynamics of moral change and how to train teachers better, we may never be able to educate large numbers of students using the developmental-educational model.

4. Ecology of Developmental Change

There have been several recent efforts to communicate to teachers a strategy to influence moral thinking. Galbraith and Jones (1976) attempt to posit some useful principles of developmental learning. While the authors' suggestions may possibly be useful, there is practically no research on what specific strategies, tactics, or dilemmas are likely to affect moral thinking. Although Kohlberg, following Mead (1934) and others, long ago postulated that social role taking, moral dialogue, stage-up exposure, and a "just" environment seem related to moral change, there is but little educational research which addresses the relative effectiveness of these strategies. I myself am not convinced by the Galbraith, Blatt, or Kohlberg suggestions on the stage-up strategy, for instance. They advise, for example, that when Suzy offers a Stage 2 argument, the teacher should counter with a Stage 3 appeal. Such an approach might work well in the suburbs, but I wonder if it would be effective in an inner-city school. Once I naively attempted to offer a Stage 3 argument after a Stage 2 monologue voiced by one of our prison-study subjects. I was quite rudely told what I could do with my argument. Such results might be expected when one follows such nonempirical prescriptive advice too literally.

Our ignorance about the social dynamics of moral change is even more serious in the realm of psychological education

and the "just" community programs. Here we are almost totally ignorant of the dynamics. Sprinthall and Mosher cite several studies in the psychological-education movement which offer nearly no explanation for why they produced change. A course on improvisational "movement" or cross-age tutoring may produce developmental change, but we have little insight (other than by referring to our old conceptual friend, social role taking) to help us explain why they do so.

My own recent research efforts with Mosher and Kohlberg are guilty of this very flaw. We have attempted to create in three school systems (Cambridge, Irvine, and Brookline) "just" community projects which seek to create participatory democratic frameworks and positive moral environments to stimulate moral change. To date we have not succeeded in being able either to measure moral environments adequately or to link such environmental measures empirically to moral change.

Such efforts to describe the social process of moral change are critical to our efforts in developmental education. The simple fact is that as yet we do not really know enough about the social context of moral change to offer teachers more than superficial advice. In my view, the next major advance in training teachers in developmental techniques must await new clinical, social, and psychological understanding of the process of developmental change.

5. Transference of Developmental Teaching Competences

A final research problem is critical to the widespread dissemination of the developmental approach. How and to whom can developmental teaching competences be transferred successfully? Most of the studies cited in the Sprinthall and Mosher paper were conducted as well as researched by university professors or doctoral candidates. The training and selection of these researchers is obviously so unusual that it raises the question as to whether "real" teachers would encounter similar results. Training studies to date (e.g., Grimes, 1975; Kohlberg, Fenton, Speicher, Colby, & Lieberman, 1975) offer encouragement that some teachers or parents can stimulate moral change in children. However, we have little information on how to train teachers in moral-education techniques, nor do we know which teachers can eventually reach minimal competence levels in developmental-education techniques. The philosophic complexity of the Kohlberg system raises the question of whether the approach only works in the hands of Stage 5 teachers selected from good university graduate programs. Can typical teachers, with far less philosophic training, accomplish the system's basic objectives? Such questions are largely unanswered by our present research.

Conclusion

These comments on Sprinthall and Mosher's paper emphasize more the tasks yet to be attempted than the contributions of developmental education to date. While these contributions have been considerable, it seems wrong to me to assume that we now have the technology to seriously redirect citizenship education in the United States. Most of the interesting questions in developmental education have barely been stated, much less resolved. In order to begin to create a principled citizenry capable of wrestling with the complex tasks of constitutional society, we need both greater understanding of the social dynamics of moral change and a far greater capacity to transfer our insights to classroom teachers.

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"BANKING" WITH "DEVELOPMENT": COMMENTS ON NORMAN A. SPRINTHALL AND RALPH L. MOSHER'S PAPER

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This commentary looks at the developmental perspective put forth by Sprinthall and Mosher and raises the question of whether developmental theory can be subject to the same criticism that the authors propose about other theories. The issue raised here is whether cognitive-development theory has not fallen prey to a sophisticated form of "banking" education à la Friere pedagogy critique.

In their recent book, Global Reach, Barnet and Muller stated:

> The closest thing to a universal goal in the contemporary world is development: the twentieth-century embellishment of the myth of progress. Modern-day religion, philosophy, and psychiatry are absorbed with the challenge of individual development, the struggle of human beings to realise their full potential....The 1960's were hailed as the "decade of development," and the cold war which reached its peak during those years was fought in the name of development. The issue was whether the "Free World Model" or the "Communist Model" would prevail. Rich, poor, capitalist, or communist, every one [sic] is for development. (Barnet & Muller, 1974, p. 160)

This quotation is in the context of a critique of multinational corporations. With minor alterations, the critique can be appropriately applied to the substantial theorizing which enveloped the social sciences in the 1960s and early 1970s--specifically in the areas of anthropology, psychology, and sociology, as well as the domain of educational

theorizing. Developmentalism has been a dominant myth which covers all sectors of contemporary life.

Sprinthall and Mosher's paper is avowedly "developmental," and therefore to question its fundamental premises is to go counter to the cultural grain. I should acknowledge, however, that in taking a critical attitude toward their basic assumptions, I find much of value in specific parts of the paper. I will refer to these areas at the end of this commentary.

With regard to my title, "banking" refers to a type of education discussed by the Latin American educator Paolo Friere (1972) in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed. In the banking concept of education, knowledge is a gift bestowed by those who consider themselves knowledgeable upon those who are less so. Users of the banking approach fail to perceive that they are involved in a system of depositing a particular ideology that is alien tc the recipient.

Sprinthall and Mosher quote Friere's work with sympathy; but I cannot help coming away from their paper with the impression that they are involved in a sophisticated North American banking concept of education which stems from a developmental ideology. Ultimately, their paper is inconsistent with the very premises they avow. Let me be specific: Sprinthall and Mosher align themselves with Dewey in formulating educational goals for the schools. For them,

as for Dewey, education and development are synonymous terms. They state:

> Dewey argued that development (or education) starts with the pupil: "Every mind, even of the youngest, is naturally or inherently seeking for those modes of active operation that are within the limits of its capacity....The problem, a difficult and delicate one, is to discover what tendencies are especially seeking expression at a particular time and just what materials and methods will serve to evoke and direct a truly educative development" (Dewey, 1934, p. 5).
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> What Dewey did not and could not know was what indeed characterizes development, whether it be intellectual, moral, or social, at a particular stage or time in a person's life. A generation of research in genetic epistemology and developmental psychology--by such people as Piaget, Kohlberg, Loevinger, and others--now offers educators clear blueprints of what people are like at various stages in their lives and what it is that stimulates their intellectual, moral, and personal-social growth.

Sprinthall and Mosher go on to describe several of these theories in detail, assuming that the whole package, with some limitations and reservations, constitutes a reasonable description of human development. They then propose that these psychological perspectives, or what I might call "blueprints," should be transposed as educational goals and ends.

Education and Social Sciences

The issue I raise is to what extent the developmental metaphor, coupled with several social science examples (e.g., developmental psychological theories), becomes another form of banking education--the new type of deposit being social

science developmental ideology. In Friere's terms, the deposit is a foreign material which does not enter organically into the everyday life of growing individuals or societies. My own position here is that transposing growth metaphors from the social sciences to the schools is a sophisticated soft sell and a potentially alienating activity--alienating because the language of psychological concepts is not the language of the schools. Stage-development theories are concocted in an entirely different context from the school setting. The issue of alienation really raises the question of what relationships our educational systems have with social science. Are the social science theories so clearly superior in their present state as to be adopted in serious ways by the culture of the school? The answer to that is ambiguous. Has the concept of intelligence and the IQ test enhanced the process of education in American schools? Has the cultural-deprivation hypothesis helped the poor or merely labeled them? What about the concept of hyperactivity? Has it helped certain types of children in schools--or simply enhanced the drug industry? Again, the answers are, at the very least, equivocal.

I would encourage educators to appraise carefully the cost and benefits of using psychological growth metaphors in the schools. While the language of the schools is different from that of the social scientists, there is no reason why

educators should feel inferior in the face of social science theorizing. I have found in my own experience that school personnel are frequently wary of psychological jargon. At first, in my blindness, I attributed their suspicion to backwardness. After all, everybody who is anybody should want the goodies that psychologists have to dish out. However, social scientists have been quite insensitive about how their constructs and findings are used in school settings. Several examples, using Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development, will illustrate the conflict: A researcher tells a teacher that one child is at the "instrumental hedonist" stage, while another is at the "good boy-nice girl" stage. There is a risk that the teacher will negatively evaluate one stage over another in a stereotyped way rather than take a developmental perspective. This is not a rare occurrence. We are becoming increasingly aware of the moral issues created when social scientists distribute personality labels (see Rosenthal, 1968; Ryan, 1972). In one of the schools in which we worked we inquired about a student who was absent from one of our biweekly classes. We were told that the teacher personally asked him to leave "because he was a wise guy and a Stage 2."

Labeling and the Pygmalion Phenomenon

It is imporant to be constantly sensitive to the fact that our labels and assessment instruments can easily become

tools of victimization (Sullivan, Beck, Joy, & Pagliuso, 1975). The misuse of a psychological theory or construct is, of course, not new to education. A classic example is the practice of using IQ scores as the basis for determining the makeup and differential treatment of schoolroom classes (see Kirp, 1974; Mercier, 1974). The work of Rosenthal (1968) indicates that positive and negative expectations created by the use of high- and low-IQ labels are a major factor in student performance.

The problem concerning moral education, suggested by Rosenthal's work, is that because of the tendency of teachers to use labels for students rather than to assess their actual moral reasonings, teachers may create expectation advantages and disadvantages for students at various levels of morality. The differential treatment of students may create self-fulfilling prophecies.

As IQ scores are intentionally or unintentionally used to determine expectation advantages, so stage labels or moral-maturity scores can also be used--and misused. Because of the lower expectation created by a label indicating a lower moral stage, a teacher may fail to recognize the increasing complexity and level of moral reasoning of a student assessed at that stage.

At this point it is important to consider the potential misuse of moral-development theory and its related assessment

instruments, to the extent that they may be misconstrued as indicators of traits or traitlike dispositions (see Hunt & Sullivan, 1974). As moral-development assessment materials become increasingly available to teachers unversed in the cognitive-developmental frame of reference from which the materials stem, it is conceivable that such materials may be used without adequate comprehension of the underlying theory itself. Teachers may, for example, see the stage label as inherent in the individual and not, for example, indicative of the absence of environmental stimulation. In this situation a theoretical construct can be misinterpreted and misused as a personality label or stereotype (Sullivan et al., 1975). In short, the teacher may blame the student for his/her lack of higher moral reasoning.

The larger issue of blaming students for a lower level of performance has been scrutinized by Ryan (1972), who provided arguments and research evidence concerning how the ideology of blaming the victim works in the school. Ryan found that the label culturally deprived, used to explain poor achievement in lower-socioeconomic-status children, was part of a central mythology involved in the blaming process. In this situation the label not only blames the student for his poor performance but also takes on a traitlike connotation that is resistant to change. Once armed with this label the teacher expects poor performance and receives it. Supposedly as a

result of problems inherent in the students rather than from anything happening within the school, so-called deprived children are seen to fail through their own defectiveness. The ideology of blaming the victim, as expressed through the label culturally deprived, holds implications for the same ideology expressed through the stage labels of moral-development theory.

The Need for Teachers to Understand Theory

An example of the pitfalls of simply exposing educators to moral-development theory without making sure they realize its developmental implications occurred within the context of a consortium on moral education (Bolt & Sullivan, 1976). One of the participants, a former teacher and now a curriculum consultant to the Ontario Ministry of Education, commented, after several classes and much outside reading, on Kohlberg's theory and on moral education: "What good is moral-development education if you can't grade the student on it on his report card?" This consortium participant was reacting to, and not fully understanding, the developmental implications of the theory, and reacting as well to the consortium leaders, who had stressed that the stage hierarchy as a grading scale must not be misconstrued. What the participant failed to understand is that the transition through stages does not represent an additive inculcation of values from an external

authority, whether it be church, school, or society in general, but rather a qualitative differentiation and integration of the previous stage into a new stage, with a concomitant self-restructuring and self-organization of the environment. Furthermore, he did not understand that transition to higher stages is not the sole responsibility of the individual; it also requires a degree of environmental stimulation. Should grading of developmental level take place, the teacher would probably evaluate the type of environmental stimulation provided by teacher, school, and society, rather than the students' ability. In this view, grading of moral-development level ought not to take place, since a particular environment is probably better suited to the needs of some students than to others.

What we have said is that labeling can be viewed in two damaging ways, or possibly as a two-part damaging process. First, the labels of stages of moral development, expressed in a hierarchy, lend themselves quite easily to those who would extrapolate them into a grading scale. Second, as individual differences become apparent, the nominative aspect of the labels can also be easily used as indicators of trait-like characteristics perceived to exist in the individual. Underlying either of these two types of labeling is the failure to understand the implications of cognitive-developmental theory.

Implementation Issues

While the evidence presented here is only suggestive, it is not too early to sound a word of caution concerning the implementation of moral-education programs. The effort to stimulate moral development is, of course, praiseworthy and must be viewed as a positive step. At the same time, it retains the potential to be abusive to those it most intends to aid. As noted earlier, Kirp (1974), Mercier (1974), Rosenthal (1968), and Ryan (1972) provide evidence in their respective studies of the deleterious effects of the misapplication of theoretical constructs in education.

Although the stage theories of Kohlberg and others can easily lend themselves to social stereotyping and stratification, they are all in their present form peculiarly insensitive to issues involving class and racial differences. A few years ago, I spent a few days at Niantic, Connecticut, in a prison wing called the Just Community. It was established by Kohlberg and others as a model community for prisoners and was apparently based on Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development. The inmates seemed obsessed with thinking about themselves in the context of stages. One prisoner said to a group, "I'm a Stage 1 and I like myself that way. I don't see why I should go any further." I was struck that they all felt they should be going somewhere in Kohlberg's stages. They seemed much more deferent to the stage theory than the

stage theory was to them. There is nothing in Kohlberg's structuralism or, for that matter, in Piaget, Erikson, and others to predict in advance that all of these prisoners would be black. Moreover, you could not help coming away with the feeling that they were in prison because of their low moral stages.

Sprinthall and Mosher have summarized as follows: "By contrast, education is most difficult and requires the most intensive interaction with those whose development has been arrested." Now I do not wish to be unfair to Sprinthall and Mosher and their developmental arguments, but they raise serious questions about priorities for educators in the 1970s. I am fully in agreement with their contention that education should be enhancement of the "practice of freedom" in the sense that Friere (1972) uses the term. But we part company when they contend that what is required for cultural action for freedom is the new developmental-learning programs. They assume that their developmentalism is congruent with Friere's "dialogical education," but, as I have tried to point out, it easily has the makings of a more sophisticated arm of the so-called banking education in the guise of North American social scientism.

I simply do not know where social science belongs when we are setting educational priorities; certainly not so far up front as Sprinthall and Mosher would have it. We should

be justifiably suspicious about the role of social scientists in the schools. I feel that the time is ripe for demythologizing their jargon if, in the process of using it, we lose our own critical judgment. Is it necessary to our culture to see ourselves through the eyes of social science concepts? Should we be attempting to push ourselves up through the stages? Will it really make us more or less moral, more or less humane?

Developmentalism and the Culture

I have worked for the last 10 years in the area of moral education, espousing many of the ideas that Sprinthall and Mosher advocate in their paper. As can be seen by my commentary, I have brought much of my previous thinking into serious question.

I think the problems that face our culture are incredibly complex and broad in scope, and no psychological theory that I know of can take these problems on, either singly or combined. Certainly no psychological education that I know of faces the difficulties produced by industrial capitalism. Will psychological education stand up to loneliness, pollution, consumer greed, and class hatred? From my own experience, I would say that psychology has been peculiarly insensitive to such issues. When social scientists do address such questions, with rare exceptions they look like

Don Quixote tilting at windmills. My only wonder is why their ideas are taken so seriously.

Notwithstanding all this criticism, there are many humane suggestions for adolescent education in Sprinthall and Mosher's paper. Their own work on deliberate psychological education is exemplary on this account. But I would not try to combine their work and many of the other studies they quote into a grand developmental blitz; it is bound to fail. Developmentalism simply cannot carry the weight of the difficulties presented by a postindustrial society. Recognition that they are complex and global does not necessarily require global solutions or even nationwide solutions. I have progressively become an anarchist in the best sense of the term; I am not looking for any grand theory of development to extricate me from the problems of our culture. I would agree with René Dubois when he says that one must think about global problems, but the only way one can act is locally.

This brings me to some final commentary that I would like to make about "cultural action for freedom." I am assuming that schools can be types of cultures and subcultures from which certain liberating activities can issue. Insofar as a particular school poses critical questions about the life world of a local community, it is involved in cultural action for freedom. To discuss and act on particular life issues that touch an entire community is, to me, moral education.

It is not important for a community to know its own stage of development from a social scientist's viewpoint. It is more important that the community discuss and act on vital problems, and that these problems issue locally from the area. In rural districts they will be rural problems; in the metropolis they will be city problems.

Almost all communities are victimized by the mass media. Country, suburb, city, and slum dweller get a steady pounding on the desirability of consuming every conceivable type of product. In this light, I would recommend that almost any community investigate some of the effects of mass communication on the development of their values and views of life. After all, by the time people reach the age of 18 they have seen more of TV than of classrooms. My own conviction is that communities at local levels must become revolutionary, i.e., must radically question a way of life that leaves most of us lonely, fragmented, suspicious, and violent. They must question the "experts" who tell them what their problems are and how they should be solved. If they are interested in the theories and findings of social scientists and professional educators, they must learn to appropriate this information on their own terms and within their own language. I am in fact saying that today good moral education involves the creation of a counterculture. But that is the topic for another paper. If that paper were written, it would reveal

broad areas of agreement with some of Sprinthall and Mosher's final recommendations--although without their big developmental package to wrap it all up in--and some serious questioning about the role of social scientists within the larger perspective.

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BIOGRAPHIES

NORMAN A. SPRINTHALL and RALPH L. MOSHER began working together in the early 1960s, first as graduate students and later as faculty colleagues at the Harvard Graduate School of Education. Both are professors of education and counseling psychologists with different, yet complementary, interests in curriculum development and teacher education for public schools. During their stint of more than a decade at Harvard they began to research the impact of schooling and later created a team of graduate students and teachers to build in-class applications of new curriculum materials designed to promote values and psychological growth. Kohlberg's move to Harvard in the late 1960s provided additional theoretical input and colleagueship. In 1972 the authors' daily working relationship ended. Sprinthall moved to the University of Minnesota, heading up a new graduate program in developmental education, and Mosher shifted to Boston University, leading its program in counselor education. Both have continued to build and assess new curriculum materials. Sprinthall's major emphasis is on a developmental-education program for teacher training, while Mosher is creating a new format for high schools based on Kohlbergian principles of justice.

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EDMUND V. SULLIVAN took his Ph.D. degree in developmental psychology at Syracuse University and also studied on a Swiss government grant with Jean Piaget. He is the author of texts on child-developmental theory (with Ausubel), educational psychology (with Hunt), and moral education (with Beck). He has taught at Syracuse, Harvard, and Simon Fraser universities and is presently joint professor of applied psychology and history and philosophy at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education.